A New German Role in the Middle East? 12 Theses
By Henner Fürtig

1. Germany is still, first and foremost, an economic trade power. Its overall trading volume with the Middle East amounted to $60 billion in 2007. In fact, Germany does not have a specific political strategy for the Middle East. The basic post-Cold War division of labor within the European Union (EU) - i.e., that Britain deals with the Arab East (mashriq), France cares for the Arab West (maghrib) and Germany endeavors to get eastern Europe smoothly into the EU - still influences current policies. If Germany is forced to act politically in the Middle East, it always prefers action within the EU "Common Foreign and Security Policy." The success Germany is most proud of concerning the Middle East during its recent EU-Presidency (January-June, 2007) is the reactivation of the Middle East Quartet (comprising the U.S., the UN, the EU, and Russia).

2. In general, the German behavior has to do with the concept of the so-called 'civil-power' which the entire political class internalized after 1945. The concept includes some strict 'do's' and 'don'ts.' The main points are: 'never alone,' 'never war, Auschwitz, genocide, etc.,' and 'strict preference of peaceful means.' Whereas the U.S. Constitution was written to protect the young nation from a largely hostile world, the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law) defined the Federal Republic as part of a larger system of collective security to which national sovereignty would be subordinated.

3. If Germany subordinates its Middle East policy to a common European policy, the EU as a whole submits to the U.S. In general, the EU confines itself to the support of U.S. endeavors. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier's proposals regarding an EU action plan provide a good example of the nature of EU support. The plan focuses on four points: support of the private sector in the economic sphere, the development of modern and democracy-oriented Palestinian security forces, improvement of the education sector (especially support for higher education), and assistance in establishing a pluralistic multi-party system.

4. Yet, no rule comes without exception. Surprisingly enough, it was not a global affair such as the end of the East-West conflict or a development in Europe such as - for instance - German re-unification when Germany, for the first time since the end of the Second World War, broke with its behavioral principles, but a conflict in the Middle East: the Iraq War. Therefore, this specific point deserves further elaboration.

5. In a campaign speech on August 5, 2002, then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder informed the public of his party's decision not to participate under any circumstances in a war to disarm Iraq or to topple Saddam Hussein's regime. The media were quick to call this new approach the 'German Way.' Although commentators and political experts were sure that the 'German Way' formula secured Schröder's reelection in September 2002, his decision to make the German (non)-participation in a probable Iraq War the main pillar of his election campaign is still breathtaking when considering Germany's foreign policy after 1945 and its, at best, junior partnership with the U.S. during these decades.

6. Attempts to explain this 'revolution' in German foreign policy were manifold. Some sought an answer to this in the biographies of the chief political characters; they were prominent representatives of the '1968 Generation,' which had challenged the existing system of the old Federal Republic more fundamentally than all of its predecessors. Of course, the rejection of the old encrusted structures included traditional foreign policy, but they had to wait until they possessed the necessary political means to realize a new political approach. Others pointed at the overall pacifist nature of the German society and its latent anti-Americanism. There is some relevance to all of these explanations, but they fail to present a proper answer to questions concerning the timing of the change, its sudden emergence, and its focus on the Iraqi issue.

7. The most important driving force behind the change was neither anti-Americanism nor pacifism, but rather a first sign of Germany's political emancipation. This resulted from reunification and the disappearance of the threats posed by the Cold War, which made subordination under the American security apparatus necessary for German survival.

8. If this is true, the question comes up as to why the 'German Way' had not been proclaimed a dozen years earlier, for example, on the occasion of the 1991 Gulf War? The answer is simple: Germany's political class and its population had to become accustomed to the new situation and were, in the first place, focused on domestic issues (i.e., the many problems of reunification). After all, it had taken three years until Helmut Kohl, Schröder's conservative predecessor, was prepared for the first time to participate in - of course multi-lateral - military actions outside of Germany. Kohl sent minor military contingents to Yugoslavia in 1993 and to Somalia in 1993-1994. After the Federal Constitutional Court's basic endorsement of military missions abroad in 1994, Germany participated substantially in the Kosovo War, yet still adhering to its behavioral principles; 'never Auschwitz' prevailed over 'strict preference of peaceful means.' The 2006 decision to provide troops for the UN mission in Lebanon was the most recent example of this new German foreign and security policy. An important side-effect of this development was the gradual familiarization of politicians and broader public alike with the fact that Germany had transformed itself from a 'consumer' to a 'producer' of international security.

9. This transformation embodies the core of Germany's new self-assuredness. From its role as a 'producer' of security in Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Kuwait, and elsewhere, Schröder's government extracted the 'right' to be consulted by its partners before they undertook far-reaching political and military initiatives. They also affirmed the 'right' to hold a differing opinion. Equal partners do not expect blind allegiance but, on the contrary, appreciate an honest counter-argument that might prevent their being harmed.

10. However, Schröder and his foreign minister Joschka Fischer were frightened at their own courage once the elections were won. Under the imminent threat of being isolated in Europe and punished by the U.S., Schröder's and Fischer's parties, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Greens respectively, once again sought shelter within the EU in general, and under a French-Russian umbrella in particular. The oppositional Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which had called the entire approach irresponsible right from the beginning, pursued a contrary strategy by demonstrably closing ranks with the U.S. Angela Merkel's 'pilgrimage' to President George W. Bush in fall 2002 was widely interpreted in the German media and public as strong proof of the fact that the other half of the political class in Germany would prefer to continue with the traditional roles within the transatlantic framework.

11. Although Schröder personally lost the early elections in September 2005, the race was so close that it resulted in a Grand Coalition of SPD and CDU/CSU. Angela Merkel became the chancellor, but within the government both camps acted more or less jointly. In the context of German foreign policy this led to a 'natural' compromise: Germany neither continued the 'German Way' nor returned to the traditional policy of subordinating its own interests to those of the U.S.

12. Thus, the durability of Germany's new self-assuredness can still be questioned. Perhaps the CDU will return - under Merkel or a successor - to the old behavior once it rules alone or with a weaker partner. This would degrade Schröder's self-assuredness to an episode of posturing as a muscle-man. At any rate, a second foreign policy solo of a similar dimension, this time under CDU leadership, would be necessary to convince skeptics.

Nevertheless, episode or not, Schröder's decision to simply not follow the American position in 2002 was a very big departure for German policy. Perhaps his interior minister Otto Schily was right when he compared German-American relations with a father-son relationship becoming a real friendship. Creating the preconditions for a mature and equal friendship between Germany and the U.S. would be the least expected, yet more than welcome, result of the Iraq War.

This essay was written in connection with the AICGS "Security and Stability: German and American Cooperation in Times of Transition" Conference, held on February 2, 2008, which was supported by The German Marshall Fund of the United States, the AICGS Business and Economics Program, and the AICGS Foreign and Domestic Policy Program.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.