Israel in NATO
By Ralf Fücks

The Transatlantic Alliance as Custodian for a Middle East Peace

The Near- and Middle East is currently a powder-keg vis-à-vis Europe.  Melting into each other there are three centers of conflict, each of which are already incendiary on their own accord.  Iraq is threatening to break apart under its own internal ethno-religious conflicts, the radical Islamist regime in Iran is provoking the U.S. and testing the political unity of the West in the conflict over nuclear technology and Israel's right to exist, and since the election of the Hamas government, a tense truce has prevailed that could at any moment collapse into a new round of violence and counter-violence between Israel and the Palestinians.  The "Road Map," that timetable for a negotiated peace, is clinically dead.  Instead, Israel's newly-elected government has set its sights on a policy of faits-accomplis, a combination of withdrawals and annexations by means of which the borders are supposed to be permanently fixed.

Iran is either directly or indirectly embroiled in all three conflicts.  In the nuclear dispute, it is squarely defying the West and is probing its room for maneuvering in negotiations with a view to changing the balance of power in the region.  In Iraq, it has long been right in there with the "Shia Connection."  And Hamas finds in Iran an anti-Zionist soul-mate that knows how to play upon the ideological and armed struggles against Israel.

The U.S. is also involved in all three conflicts.  It is an occupying power in Iraq, it is Iran's primary opponent in the conflict over the nuclear option, and it is Israel's (only) guarantor if push comes to shove.

What role does Europe play among these fault lines right in its back yard?  A European Iraq policy has not existed up to now; the old divisions from the time of the American intervention are still there.  The European allies from back then are trying to emerge somewhat unscathed from the Iraqi adventure, the opponents of the war alternate between saying "I told you so" and quietly hoping that the Americans might hang in there long enough to stabilize the situation militarily and politically.  In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Europeans play, at best, the role of financier; a common strategy in the face of the altered situation is not discernable and, on account of internal differences, might be hard to come by.  In the nuclear dispute with Iran, the European troika (France, Great Britain, and Germany) has used up all of its trump cards; now the superpowers are holding all the cards.  This is not a great outcome for the "Common European Foreign and Security Policy."

If the Europeans want to play an active role in conflict management on their opposite shores to the south, then they can only do it in concert with the U.S.  One can learn from Iraq where the West's drifting-apart leads to.  The U.S. cannot single-handedly solve the problems; on the other hand, the attempt at creating a counterweight along the "Paris-Berlin-Moscow-axis" has failed dismally.  This debacle can not be allowed to be repeated with regard to Iran.  Only a concerted transatlantic course of action can bring about a political solution to the nuclear dispute.  Those who, at this stage, seek to distance the Federal Republic of Germany and Europe as far as possible from America are provoking a situation in which the U.S. (and Israel) are faced with the dilemma of either accepting a nuclear-armed Iran or risking a military strike.  Likewise, a revival of the negotiating process between Israel and the Palestinians is only, if at all, possible through a concerted effort of the West.  Therein lies an obligation for both sides to refrain from going it alone and to strive toward a joint strategy.

An easing of the Middle-East conflict is central to a successful containment of the revolutionary regime in Iran.  If the U.S. and Europe want to win support in the Arab world for a hard line towards the regime in Tehran, they must intervene in a credible way for the vital interests of the Palestinians without jeopardizing Israel's security.  Granted that the Iranian bomb is also a nightmare for the governing regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States, but among the Arab masses, sympathies are directed elsewhere.  As long as hopelessness and bitterness remain widespread among Palestinians, Iran also has every opportunity to play the terrorist card against Israel.

For this reason, the West must, as rapidly as possible, go back to an active Middle East policy in the face of the ideological and political challenge posed by Iran.  In order to induce movement on the stalled front lines, a bold castling of the king is needed: NATO must take on the role of guarantor for peace and security in the Middle East.  That comprises a whole package of political propositions and initiatives:

- The proposition of NATO membership for Israel, linked to the resumption of negotiations with the Palestinians over a two-state solution;

- The initiative for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Near- and Middle East, linked to a security guarantee for Israel;

- The proposition of a "Marshall-Plan" for the economic and social modernization of the region, coupled with minimum standards of democracy and the rule of law.

The experience with the Middle East conflict up to this point shows that it is more than just a matter of a well-balanced peace plan that just has to be implemented.  There have been many peace plans already, what has remained is the conflict.  A fundamental reason for the stagnation is the lack of trust, that - not without reason! - prevails on both sides.  The mistrust on the Israeli side in the Palestinians' capacity for peace has become so great that large parts of the population - including a part of the pro-peace camp - believe that only a several-meter-high concrete wall can bring them their long-sought security.  At issue is merely the route of this "security fence."  Many have given up on aiming for a peaceful neighborly relationship - the only realistic thing in this perspective is the absence of war.

Those who would support a turn toward peace in the Middle East must therefore consider the legitimate security interests of Israel.  Any realistic peace policy must confront the fact that in the eyes of most Israelis, a withdrawal from the occupied territories and the foundation of a Palestinian state entail a risk for Israel's future that is difficult to calculate.  There is every indication that a just peace between Israelis and Palestinians could stem the tide of widespread anti-Semitism in the Arab would.  There are, however, sufficient forces among the Palestinians and in the radical Islamic movements that will never come to terms with the existence of Israel as a Jewish state.  What is needed, therefore, are strong guarantees for Israel in the framework of a comprehensive agreement that establishes security for both sides.

Who else besides NATO can serve as guarantor for peace and security in the Middle East?  The fact is that the vast majority of Israelis does not trust the UN and will not put UN-led peacekeeping troops in charge of their security.  There are too many "anti-Zionists" in the United Nations for that, who view Israel as a thorn in the side of the Islamic world and as a colonial outpost of the U.S.  It is too much of a stretch for the European Union alone to play the role of peacemaker in the Middle East.  That applies - for different reasons - also to the U.S.  But together they would be able to shoulder this historic burden, and in their own interest as well.  Therefore, NATO must take over this task.

The Middle East needs bold prospects to overcome the roadblocks to modernization in the region and to advance the democratic transformation in the Arab states.  An historic compromise between the Palestinians and Israelis that would lead to peace at this crux of conflict between the West and the Islamic world is in the utmost interest of the United States as well as the EU.  The conflict at the periphery of the continent is an incubator for terrorism, it undermines the authority of the U.S. in the region, potentially endangers the security of Europe, and foments the existing tensions between ethnic and religious groups in European immigration destinations.  Money and friendly words alone will not be sufficient to promote security and cooperation in the Middle East.

Membership in the transatlantic defensive alliance would give Israel the political and psychological assurance to agree to an historic compromise with the Palestinians by which both sides reciprocally recognize each other as sovereign states.  The guarantee of support in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Treaty would give Israel the backing that it needs in order to undertake the risk of a withdrawal from the West Bank.  By the same token, such a solution would make it possible for Palestine to finally become a sovereign state that controls its own destiny.

As a supporting measure, Palestine should be provided with reconstruction assistance on the model of the Marshall Plan that launched West Germany's recovery from the ruins of World War II.  This assistance must be tied to the obligation to set up a democratic, constitutional state that guarantees the rule of law and separation of powers.

Why should the offer of a NATO membership first be extended to Israel?  Membership in the transatlantic alliance should be reserved for democratic states in order to preserve the identity and coherence of the alliance as a community of common values.  Imposing this condition is not a rejection of a future incorporation of Arab states into NATO, but rather a description of a possible path in that direction.  NATO should, in the future, open itself up to new members on other continents anyway, as its best prospect for success and security lies in a global security alliance of democratic states.
 
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Ralf Fücks is on the executive board of the Heinrich Boell Foundation, which is affiliated with the German Green Party.

This essay originally appeared in German on Der Spiegel Online.  To read the German version, please click here. 
This English version first appeared in the June 2006 issue of Transatlantische Politik.  It also appeared in the August 3, 2006 AICGS Advisor.