The Middle East as Fulcrum for the Transatlantic Relationship: Bush, Kerry, and German Views on a Critical Region
By Lily Gardner Feldman

In the past few years, several Washington think tanks, including AICGS, have issued reports emphasizing the importance of cooperation on the Middle East as a way to heal or reenergize the transatlantic relationship. Following the June 2004 G-8 summit's commitment to a "Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa," a recent publication of the Atlantic Council went so far as to lend this region primary, agenda-setting status: "Since the end of the Cold War, events in the broader Middle East have increasingly become the principal determinants of the state of the transatlantic relationship." In the same vein, the important September 2004 Berlin "Ambassadors' Conference," bringing together German heads of mission from around the world, chose the Middle East as its main focus.

Whether we accept the Middle East as the fulcrum of transatlantic relations or view it as too fragile to bear the weight of U.S.-European ties is largely irrelevant, for governments and elites will continue to consider it primary and events on the ground will continue to command response. What we can do is to point up the similarities and differences on the Middle East among Bush, Kerry and Germany (within the context of the European Union), as a way of anticipating the trajectory of transatlantic relations after the November 2nd election. A critical feature of the central components of the Greater Middle East conundrum - Iran and nuclear weapons; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the War in Iraq -- is their inextricable linkage, demanding attention, vision, and action on all three fronts at once.

Iran
The main differences between the current U.S. administration and the German government (together with France and the United Kingdom) over Iran reside in method and timing. Whereas the United States prefers the isolation of Iran as an "axis of evil," Germany pursues a policy of constructive engagement that now involves negotiation of a bargain: provision of nuclear fuel to Iran for peaceful energy purposes together with economic incentives in exchange for suspension of uranium enrichment to be used for nuclear bombs.

Despite Teheran's earlier rejection of the EU-3's proposal, Germany, France and the UK have continued their efforts to exhaust all possibilities before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is required to bring the issue of Iran's non-compliance with safeguard obligations to the UN Security Council for opening the discussion of sanctions against Iran. The United States, by contrast would like immediate discussion of sanctions by the UN.

The issue of a nuclear Iran will come to a head shortly after the U.S. election in light of two factors: the IAEA deadline of November 25 th for Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and answer all of IAEA's questions about Teheran's nuclear program; and the American plan to sell to Israel "bunker buster" bombs that could take out Iran's underground nuclear facilities.

Kerry's position is closer to the European perspective regarding a quid pro quo and negotiating until the last minute. He also calls for U.S. leadership so as not to leave the definition of the agenda and negotiations to Europe alone. He would work with the Europeans for effective sanctions if Iran fails to accept the bargain. Kerry emphasizes that a nuclear armed Iran is a danger to the United States and American allies in the region, meaning principally Israel.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
As over Iran, the United States and the Europeans are divided on both the framework and the timing of negotiations. Both sides formally support a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as based on the Road Map of the Quartet (U.S., EU, UN and Russia), but differ over its activation. Europeans are concerned that the United States has not pressured (or not sufficiently so) Israel to retreat from its unwillingness to deal with the Quartet. The Bush administration has supported Sharon's plan for an Israeli unilateral pull-back from Gaza, which one European critic has equated with putting the road map in "formaldehyde." Germany, and the EU, has welcomed the planned Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as an opportunity, as long as it does not amount to a "Gaza first and Gaza only" initiative, but leads to a solution on the West Bank. Europeans identify an American lack of engagement and commitment to a near-term political resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the very time that conditions on the ground push the two sides even further apart.

Kerry and Bush largely agree on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with both accepting a two-state solution, but emphasizing Israel's need for security. Kerry has criticized the Bush administration in two areas: lack of high-level engagement to activate the Road Map; and insufficient efforts to build up a credible Palestinian interlocutor. Kerry insists that he would make resolution of the conflict a priority, appointing a high-level, experienced, and publicly visible envoy, and that he would initiate confidence-building measures in the territory of the Palestinian Authority. Regarding both hard and soft security, Kerry's language is similar to that of German Foreign Minister Fischer, whose tones toward Israel are less strident (the "special relationship") than those of his EU counterparts.

Iraq
There is a world of difference between the Bush administration and Germany on Iraq, with the Schröder government and the French government providing the main European opposition. Again the divergence revolves around timing and framework, at least for the French, who wanted inspections to run their full course, and only then to contemplate UN, not unilateral action. On these two aspects, Schröder's view has been crystal clear: even if the inspection regime had been utilized fully and military action had been taken with a UN mandate, Germany would have opposed the war. Germany is not, however, completely uninvolved, demonstrating willingness to train Iraqi security forces outside Iraq (in the United Arab Emirates), to provide reconstruction aid, and to promote a UN political framework.

Kerry sees the war in Iraq as a fundamental mistake, based on faulty reasoning and deception by the President. It distracts and detracts from the larger war on terrorism that should be focused in Afghanistan, and has caused serious harm to the U.S. image abroad. Kerry would elicit support of European allies by convening a summit conference on Iraq, and by increasing NATO's involvement. Both would entail efforts to increase troop support and training for Iraqi security forces. The latter has already been a source of conflict within NATO, with France and Germany objecting to in situ activity. Although Kerry has proposed a withdrawal date for American troops in Iraq, he also has suggested a short-term increase of 40,000 troops. Any Kerry suggestion of NATO troops is a non-starter for France, Germany, Spain and Belgium. The immediate issue after the November 2 nd election is whether, how, and with what consequences elections will be held in Iraq early next year.

After November 2nd
A Kerry victory on November 2nd (or sometime thereafter) will mean a multilateral framework for transatlantic relations rather than the unilateralism of the Bush administration. However, Kerry still talks of American leadership, and it remains to be seen what kind of leadership is acceptable to Europeans. If leadership means the earlier notion of "partners in leadership" in which Europe is recognized for its particular strengths, especially in soft power economic and diplomatic tools, and treated as a relative equal in a cooperative endeavor, then the Middle East may be the arena that helps restore the transatlantic relationship and finally reflects what constitutes a healthy division of labor. If leadership still means the United States defines the terms of reference, even with benign, calming words, and the Europeans are expected to follow, then the Middle East will constitute yet another arena where Americans and Europeans have not yet grasped what partnership means.

In a Kerry administration (multilateralism by conviction) or a reformed Bush administration (multilateralism by necessity), there will be a need for compromises in the transatlantic relationship if there are to be genuine "partners in leadership." Iran is perhaps the easiest area in which to achieve this as an engagement strategy already exists; the United States just has to join it in a face-saving way. The Europeans will need to be more serious about coercive sanctions; the German Foreign Minister has already warned the Iranians not to underestimate the resolve of the international community.

Transatlantic compromise will be more difficult on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but in exchange for American reactivation of the Quartet framework and the Road Map process by leaning on Israel, Europeans will have to find some way of being genuinely even-handed in understanding both sides' security needs (and not just the Palestinians'). Here Germany can play a unique role: Foreign Minister Fischer has excellent relations with both Israel and the Palestinians; he has already demonstrated success as a mediator, for example in spring 2002, when he convinced both Sharon and Arafat to de-escalate tensions after the suicide-bombing of a night club in Israel.

Iraq will be the hardest issue on which to find a deal between the United States on the one side and Germany and France on the other, as both Bush and Kerry for some time to come will pursue primarily a military strategy to which both Schröder and Chirac are ideologically opposed. Here there is a difference in kind between important European countries and the United States, and not just a difference of degree.

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Lily Gardner Feldman is an AICGS Senior Fellow in Residence.

This essay appeared in the October 28, 2004 AICGS Advisor. .................................................................................................
The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.