Germany's "Special Relationship" with Israel Continues, Despite Appearances to the Contrary
By Lily Gardner Feldman

Consistent with Germany's criticism of US policy in Iraq, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder recently expressed concern over Prime Minister Sharon's Gaza disengagement proposal and its endorsement by President Bush: "One-sided, unilateral solutions are in most cases not the best way of 'global government.'" He further warned against making decisions on final status issues over the heads of the Palestinians. Such statements taken alone seem to reinforce the current conventional view that Germany's special relationship with Israel is over. If, however, one takes a broader approach by considering other statements by German leaders, and by focusing on Germany's quiet actions, the historically-determined "special relationship" appears more vibrant. Moreover, this "unique partnership" with Israel could well enable Germany to play an intermediary role in both the Middle East and transatlantic arenas.

Even-Handedness

Immediately after the Sharon-Bush announcement, Schröder's spokesperson deemed the Sharon plan "an important step on the way to bringing about a two-state solution as foreseen in the 'road map,'" and Foreign Minister Fischer characterized the Sharon-Bush initiative as a "new dynamic." Efforts on the political level to address the concerns of both Israelis and Palestinians - an "even-handed" (ausgewogen) approach - date back to the early 1970s. While Israel would like one-sided praise from Germany, it recognizes that even-handedness is preferable to the pro-Palestinian views of other Europeans. Israel also appreciates that Germany has acted as a brake on EU positions in the past (for example, toning down the language of the June 1980 Venice Declaration) and in the present (objecting to the EU call in April 2002 for economic sanctions against Israel). Most recently, while expressing concern over the location of the wall Israel is building between itself and the Palestinians, Germany accepted the need for the separation and argued forcefully in the EU that the legality of the barrier should not be brought before the International Court in The Hague.

Honest Broker

Israel recognizes Germany's role as friend in both public gratitude when Germany champions Israel's cause and in private thanks when Germany displays even-handedness. And, as a hallmark of the special relationship, the Jewish state has gone even further by entrusting Germany with negotiating one of the most delicate and sensitive issues on its foreign policy agenda. At the end of January, Israel exchanged over 400 prisoners for an Israeli businessman and the remains of three Israeli soldiers held by Hezbollah. While the exchange itself received front-page attention, Germany's role went relatively unnoticed.

At least two aspects of the exchange reveal the depth of trust between the two states: First, Germany has acted as steadfast (and not incidental) broker on this exchange for at least three years; was intermediary on another exchange already in 1996; and will negotiate the next stage (concrete information about the Israeli airman Ron Arad in exchange for the Lebanese militant Samir Kantar). Secondly, a significant part of the exchange took place on German soil, with two military planes departing for Cologne at the same time from Lebanon and Israel, and Israel's chief pathologist, medical personnel, and rabbis traveling to Germany to identify the Israeli remains. While Germany declined to offer much comment about the exchange, Foreign Minister Fischer was willing to acknowledge Germany's special role: "We could be helpful, and evidently Germany has the necessary trust from both sides." It is the bona fides with both Israelis and Palestinians and the active relations with the Arab world and Iran that place Germany in a unique position as a Western power.

A Larger Role?

Germany has played the role of honest broker in the Middle East on other occasions, most notably in June 2001 after the suicide bombing of a Tel Aviv nightclub. Fischer, who happened to be in Israel at the time, shuttled between Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat, eliciting restraint from the former, condemnation of violence from the latter and a willingness to return to negotiations from both. Fischer is reluctant to play the role of mediator, and always emphasizes that German initiatives, such as his 2002 Middle East "idea paper," be seen in the context of the EU and the Quartet and in cooperation with the United States (the "German way" of multilateralism). From the Arab and Palestinian perspective, the Sharon-Bush initiative called into serious question the US role as even-handed intermediary. The US role remains indispensable, as demonstrated by the White House visit of King Abdullah of Jordan (following an initial cancellation in response to Sharon and Bush). However, if the "glue" of transatlantic relations is to be found in long-term vision and active cooperation on the Greater Middle East, as many observers in Washington believe, the United States needs the aid of a powerful supporting role both in the Middle East and across the Atlantic. Germany's "special relationship" with Israel and excellent ties to the Palestinians and the Arab world position it uniquely to tender that support.

Dr. Lily Gardner Feldman is a Senior Fellow at AICGS.

This essay appeared in the May 6, 2004 AICGS Advisor.

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The views expressed in this essay are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.