Challenges for the New Chancellor
By Klaus Dieter Frankenberger

It has been three months now since Chancellor Gerhard Schröder electrified German politicians, voters and journalists by taking the biggest gamble of his gamble-filled term in office. He said on May 22 that he planned to call national elections roughly one year ahead of schedule. "The people should say who should govern them," he told the stunned nation.

In the quick analysis that followed, the consensus was that the person forming a new governing would not be Schröder. That feeling still holds true today, according to the latest polls. These surveys indicate that Angela Merkel and her Christian Democrats will form the next government as Schröder's election plan has cleared a review by the national supreme court and voters will go to the polls on September 18.

Which direction could Germany take under Ms. Merkel if she were indeed to become chancellor? In a nutshell, her major priorities would be to overcome Germany's economic malaise, reset the foreign-policy compass, and restore a balance in the country's key international relationships.

The foremost repair job is to reinvigorate the German economy. Schröder came into office vowing that he would magically cut the noose of joblessness that is choking Europe's biggest economy. But the chancellor who once envisioned unemployment figures of 2.5 million is being confronted by a total that is dangerously close to 5 million. All other issues facing a new German chancellor, important as they are, pale in comparison to this one, at least in the eyes of both the public and the politicians; this will be the overriding priority of the next government, no matter who leads it.

The German economy is far from the only area where Schröder has left an unsettling imprint, though. He nearly severed Germany's ties with the United States through his grandstanding against the Bush administration's military planning in Iraq - which did not prevent the war from happening, but got him a second term and established his government in the eyes of many votes as a force for peace. He has tried for a brief moment to resuscitate this old trick this year. He has simply dropped the word "Iraq" and substituted it with the word "Iran" as part of the debate about Tehran's nuclear ambitions. This time, however, he has seen much more limited results, even though the reservoir of anti-Bushism is still deep and wide and accusations of "blind allegiance" do find a certain resonance. But, this year it is not an F&B (floods and Bush) election, an election turned around by the floods in East Germany and the tapping of anti-American, anti-Bush, and anti-war sentiments.

Schröder has caused similar damage in Europe. First, he alienated many of the new European Union members by the tactics used in teaming up with French President Jacques Chirac in a bid to stop the Iraq war. Afterward, he dug further divisions as he bulldozed over the stability pact governing the euro. You might remember that this very pact was the cornerstone of the Kohl administration's policies on the very same currency.

Given this dark picture, what should a new government led by Angela Merkel strive to do? She would, and should, base her foreign policies on a set of key principles:

• She should regain trust.

• She should prove Germany's reliability and renew its alliance credentials.

• She should show consistency.

• She should find a new balance between Europe and the Unites States, between Paris and Washington. This recalibration would have to be done carefully and wisely so as not to arouse a new wave of anti-American sentiment and undermine the credibility of the new government at an early stage.

• She should also dust off Germany's previous international and European role and offer again benign leadership, particularly in Europe.

As chancellor, she would have an immediate opportunity to place this broad umbrella of principles over a number of foreign-policy disputes. The most interesting issue would be the direction of Germany's relations with the United States.

Under Ms. Merkel's leadership, the United States would be unlikely to feel the same sort of caustic heat from its crucial ally. That is because Merkel - and many members of her Christian Democratic Union - realize that the United States remains Germany's partner of choice. The overlapping interests between the United States and Germany are just too great for any other type of relationship.

Still, Schröder's public castigation of the Bush administration in 2002 and 2003 does raise the question about how Germany will be able to influence the United States' agenda and its activities on the world stage. The answer is complex. It begins with the knowledge of the inner-political actors and their interests, and ends with Germany's own strategic maturity. This form of maturity includes, among other things, strategic thinking. Simple proclamations by Schröder that he intends to speak with the United States eye to eye will accomplish very little. And such an approach would not be Ms. Merkel's style of governing. She would be likely to accept U.S. security interests and work to have her voice heard.

And Ms. Merkel's voice should be heard, given the new political and geopolitical environment. That is because Germany remains the United States' most important partner, and it is the country that can sway the European Union and steer Europe's relationship with the United States. For Germany, the United States will remain the indispensable power needed to achieve German and European goals.

At the same time, however, Ms. Merkel would be unlikely to initiate a major shift in one of Schröder's cornerstone foreign-policy issues - the chancellor's refusal to send any troops to Iraq. On this issue, the United States should not get its hopes up.

But Washington could expect the rhetoric to be tuned way down. It would likely hear Germany start to talk much more positively about the issues of democracy in the Middle East, Iraq, and its security requirements - and what Germany could do to help.

On issues related to Iran, Ms. Merkel would be unlikely to veer from Schröder's course. Neither of them would want to have any German boots on the ground in any type of hot military environment.

But the similarities stop there. Schröder, who likes to talk about Germany as the power of peace, would eventually cave in to Iran as it presses forward with its nuclear activities. Ms. Merkel, on the other side, could be more ready to accept the U.N. Security Council playing a robust role in the effort to shut off Iran's nuclear work. Here, her approach would likely be low key, but one that would seek to avoid creating another schism in the transatlantic relationship.

The overall German reaction to Iran and its nuclear aims differ from its previous reaction to Iraq. After all, Germans can actually see on television the potential danger in Iran. According to recent polls, they do not see this as some CIA-hyped concoction of imagined threats. This is the main reason why Schröder's attempt to mobilize voter support by manipulating the Iran issue failed.

Closer to home, the next German chancellor will have a number of serious questions to address about the future of the European Union. Under Schröder, the German relationship to the Union has been considerably marked by ignorance, heavy-handedness, and alienation; to many, this has come as a surprise, especially given Foreign Minister Fischer's European rhetoric. But then again, it was only rhetoric. It has been Schröder's hand-in-hand alliance with French President Jacques Chirac that has driven the wedge between the members. Both leaders were at the forefront of the opposition against Iraq, both have torn apart the European stability pact, and both have absolutely no idea of how to overcome the current constitutional predicament the EU is in. And a crisis is what the EU is experiencing.

If Ms. Merkel were to become chancellor, her first priority regarding the European Union would be to address the alienation caused by the Schröder-Chirac brotherhood. The world is facing serious security problems, and the EU is wrestling with integration problems growing out of last year's enlargement. As a result, the claim of leadership staked out by Schröder and Chirac is no longer enough, particularly if such a partnership is seen as strictly a protective, if not protectionist undertaking. The EU needs to work out a new collection of leadership to guide it through these issues. In the process, Germany will have to slip out of its bear hug with France. The result could be that Germany emerges as the mediator who settles the differences between socially committed servers of the state in France and the no-holds-barred capitalists in the United Kingdom. And as far the caricature holds, it may even work, particularly after the French presidential elections in 2007.

In terms of Europe's relationship with the United States, Ms. Merkel should take a different approach on the EU level to Schröder's policy of estrangement. With her, the United States would not see any attempt by Germany - either actively or by way of its alliance with France - to turn the EU into a force to counterbalance the United States. Ms. Merkel, a woman from East Germany, is smart enough to realize that this approach has only negative consequences. First, it would divide the EU by alienating those new eastern European countries who consider the United States to be a democratic role model and underwriter of their security. Second, it would fuel American unilateralism.

The next German chancellor also will have three other major EU issues on his or her plate in Berlin: the future of the EU constitution, the reform of the EU's finances, and the next round(s) of enlargement.

The problems with the constitution emerged in May when French voters rejected the charter that was so close to Chirac's heart. A few weeks later, the EU's leaders decided to introduce "a time for debate and reflection" on the future of the constitution. During this period, the next German chancellor would have to realize that a continuation of the ratification process would make no sense because it would be an invitation to generate more opposition within the EU's ranks.

The next chancellor, as well as his or her EU counterparts, also will have to reflect on just what the future of the organization will be. In the process, they should realize that the idea of creating a group of nation states held together under the federal banner of the EU is most likely an elitist dream that most voters view as a potential nightmare. For the time being the result should be a focus on the core material issues - competitiveness, employment, and growth.

The future will certainly involve a debate on the next round of enlargement. And that means the possible membership of Turkey. Schröder and his major coalition partner, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer of Alliance 90/The Greens, have made this possibility the centerpiece of their policies on Turkey.

Merkel, on the other hand, has something else in mind. Before and after the EU decided to open membership negotiations with Turkey in October, she has pushed something she calls a "privileged partnership" between the EU and Turkey. As reasons for her opposition, she has pointed to Turkey's views of religion, human rights, and geopolitics, of institutional overload and overextension within the EU.

If Merkel became chancellor, Germany would no longer be the main continental force behind Turkey's membership bid. The Christian Democrats and their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, will remain opposed to the plan. But once in office, they may have to adjust this opposition to the new realities: the negotiations are already a done deal. As a result, they will only be able to insist that the outcome of the negotiations will not be predetermined as full-membership. Concerning the Ukraine, the Balkans, and other countries that want a European perspective, we may see much greater efforts in creative thinking and a stronger emphasis on variable geometry. The drive for defining the external borders of the EU and to arrest somewhat the waves of enlargement may intensify after the change in government in Germany.

While Schröder has alienated the United States and some EU partners, he has done his best to befriend Russia and China. Schröder has almost become buddies with Vladimir Putin of Russia. While many people criticize Putin's rigid hold on Chechnya, Schröder has stood firmly at the Russian's side. And he may have good economic reasons for doing so. Germany imports around 30 percent of its oil and natural gas from Russia.

But, as Merkel may know, there is more to Germany's polices toward Russia than energy. And a change in Germany's policies toward Russia could start over the very issue about which Schröder has had nothing critical to say - the long rebellion in Chechnya. This is one of the Schröder government's most troubling stances. He has also basically accepted Putin's return to authoritarian forms of governing. Ms. Merkel, on the contrary, would not continue the building of a new Berlin-Moscow-axis, as it awakens the fears and anxieties of old victims who have become new partners, such as Poland and the Baltic states.

The chancellor has taken a get-down-to-business approach to China as well. He made his six visits to the country since taking office in October 1998. During the most recent visit in December, he helped arrange €1.4 billion in business for German companies, including Siemens and DaimlerChrysler. His enthusiasm for the Chinese was not just restricted to business. During the first half of the year, he regularly called for the European Union to drop the arms embargo that it imposed on China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. His explanation: "The China of today is not the China of 1989."

The rise of a major power, like China, poses a high risk in security terms, and one cannot nonchalantly dismiss such a major issue as Schröder has done and ignore the strategic implications. The issue becomes even more sensitive in the wake of China's threats against Taiwan and the U.S.' security commitments to that island democracy.

Ms. Merkel is aware of these and other dangers associated with the rise of a power that is still communist ruled. She also is likely to realize that multi-polar thinking may be the wrong approach to take on such an issue. She realizes that this is an issue that should be addressed on the basis of a strong Atlantic partnership.

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Klaus Dieter Frankenberger is the International Editor at the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and a frequent contributor to AICGS.
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This essay appeared in the September 8, 2005 AICGS Advisor.