QUE RESTE-IL DE NOTRE AMOUR? A Hard Time for Europe Without Leadership
by Tjark Egenhoff

Those who are scared of a Franco-German directoire driving the European Union can sit back and relax these days. The times when both countries held common positions leading to consensus in the Convention are over. The German government has slowly discarded the idea of deeper integration as a political priority. The shift towards a more strategic approach in European policy after 9/11-most prominently advocated by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer- is remarkable. On the French side, major political parties struggle to gain internal support for the Constitutional treaty - unimaginable just a year ago. Although the consultation mechanisms between the two governments work fairly well, the spirit of a courageous European agenda that puts the partnership at the lead of the integration process following its biggest enlargement is not palpable. On the contrary, in both countries political support for the idea of an internally and externally more self-confident Europe is loosing ground. And risks of a new split are being overlooked on both sides of the Rhine.

This happens at a time of major changes in the European Union. Despite strong objections from both the German and French public, on December 17, 2004, the Council invited Turkey to proceed with accession negotiations as an official candidate country to the European Union. And since October, time is running out on the ratification of the new Constitutional treaty.

The good news is that the public does not seem to be as indifferent as it is often depicted: In both countries people demand legitimate clarifications on crucial issues that have been left unanswered in the debate over the European Constitution. Moreover, they demand participation in the process. With Turkey having one foot in the Union, people feel the need to define the geographical and political boundaries that form the European Union of the future. European citizens want to know what they can expect from a European Union that has undergone several waves of enlargement - without their prior consultation. Especially in France, citizens are unwilling to accept further financial burdens as well as constraints on their sovereignty if the goal of integration is degenerated to a simple common market model. A feeling of this resistance became obvious at the French Socialist Party's assembly with former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius rejecting the Constitutional treaty mainly for its neo-liberal spirit. The question that arises is fundamental: Are we able to follow the political project of an efficient Union aware of its own identity and interests with thirty or more members and which extends its borders to Iraq and Iran? Or do we have to be content with the option of a common market with common rules. No less than the vision of a political union is at stake.

Meanwhile France and Germany are busy freezing their net contributions to the EU-budget to as little as 1 percent of their GDP. With a decreasing budget and a considerable increase in the number of member states benefiting from common funds, the EU will simply not be able to achieve its internal policy goals. This attitude once again discredits the output-legitimacy of the European institutions, which will fall short in deliverance: How can we build a competitive space for science and education in Europe if we do not invest in it?

At the same time, Germany is pursuing a seat (and its own veto right) on the UN-Security Council with all its diplomatic weight. Yet only some isolated members of the European Parliament, mainly from Joschka Fischer's Green Party, have questioned this step by pointing out that it could damage the goal of a common European seat. The German national reflex and the unwillingness on the side of the French and the British to discuss this issue at a time when creative proposals for the reform of the UN are desperately needed, reflect the lack of a common agenda for external relations between France and Germany. It is yet another opportunity lost to give the EU that one voice at the world stage that citizens demand.

A Franco-German couple, whose common agenda in Europe is driven by the desire to safeguard its potentially overlapping interests, is just another alliance that will not withstand existing differences in perception in the long run. Its acceptance within Europe will further diminish because it represents no leadership at all, but nurtures the cliché of an exclusive Franco-German axis - especially with the smaller member states.

Nevertheless, the Franco-German relationship remains vital to the development of European integration: Following enlargement it was often heard that Germany and France are just another two among twenty-five member states. However, this equation is misleading: The EU is not merely an intergovernmental organization, but also a Union of citizens with a right to elect a common Parliament. The two countries account for 142 million citizens. Furthermore, they contribute approximately 41 percent to the EU budget. The Franco-German reconciliation and their intellectual contribution to the integration process is unique: It is their capacity to overcome national interests, which often leads to substantial progress in integration - the creation of the Euro is just one example. It would be dangerous for the cohesion of the Union to ignore the weight of the bigger member states as well as to play down the legitimacy of the Franco-German relationship.

Regarding the implications of enlargement, the indispensable reform of EU-financing, the necessity of giving the European citizen a voice and the challenge to adopt the European Constitution, there is a strong need for leadership in the Union.(1) Germany and France will be held responsible if they do not acknowledge the fact that they can contribute substantially to solutions, e.g., organizing a common referendum on the European Constitution on the same day in 2005 (assuming the Constitutional amendment in Germany for this matter), presenting initiatives to guarantee substantial internal resources to the EU through EU corporate taxes, working towards a common seat in international (financial) organizations, as well as debating openly the implications of Turkey's entry into the Union. It is time to prove that both countries defend the idea of a political union that constitutes not only a communauté de destin, but also a unique system of shared solidarity - an ideal that is far more than the functioning of the common market. Europe needs leadership: The Franco-German couple could make a difference if it were finally willing to anticipate further steps of integration bilaterally, in order to create the necessary dynamics in integration. They would be surprised at the willingness of other member countries to participate.

The debate on Turkey illustrates that a Franco-German agenda for Europe is far from being implemented. And there is a risk many may fail to notice: If a French referendum should deny accession to Turkey after it has accomplished a long and painful series of reforms, the political blame will remain solely with that country. The emphasis of the present German administration in favor of Turkey's accession into the Union could therefore lead to a serious bilateral problem in the future.

The Council's decision regarding Turkey has important implications for the political dimension of the European project: Public opinion is ignored, the political project endangered. It will be impossible in the long run to compel the Europeans into forced marriages.(2) The lack of consultation of the European citizens will result in disenchantment with the European idea. Both French and German citizens should have the right to decide on essential issues such as the accession of Turkey: We will see that we share the same doubts and hopes for Europe.

(1)See Goulard/Meyer-Landruth et al. (2003), Deutschland und Frankreich in Europa: Leadership hat seinen Preis, in www.europartenaires.info-europe.fr

(2)For an indepth discussion on Turkish accession, please see Sylvie Goulard, Le Grand Turc et la Republique de Venise, Paris 2004.

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This essay appeared in the January 12, 2005 AICGS Advisor.

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.