Germany and America: Can We Have a Global Transatlantic Agenda?
By Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel

In Iraq, Iran, and China and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, American leadership is being tested. So is the German-American relationship. Walter Russell Mead a year ago pointed out two basic truths about German-American relations:

"First, a solid and stable relationship between the United States and Germany remains, as it has for more than half a century, the indispensable precondition for progress toward European integration. Second, the area now causing the greatest disputes between Germany and the United States - the Middle East - is the area in which the two countries have major interests in common, and where both stand to gain the most by finding their way to a cooperative path."

As we consider issues we face in the German-American relationship, we need to ask what has changed in German foreign and security policy. The Council on Foreign Relations has come to the conclusion that the most important change came through German unification and the restoration of full sovereignty to Germany on October 3, 1990. The Council on Foreign Relations Task Force concluded that the current rift in transatlantic relations is not solely a product of the war in Iraq, but that the war "brought these strains to a point of crisis." The roots of today's tensions extend as far back as November 9, 1989, the day in 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down and removed the Soviet threat that had for decades brought the United States and Europe together; strains were exacerbated, in turn, by the events of 9/11 and the U.S.-led war on terrorism, which created diverging threat perceptions and priorities across the Atlantic.

Along with sovereignty that came with German unification came responsibility for Germany's own and for European Union collective security. However, the first step taken by Germany to exercise that sovereignty was in 1991, when Germany and the EU recognized Croatia and accelerated the end of Yugoslavia, and changed an internal, domestic Yugoslav conflict into one that dragged in the United States with American military intervention, despite the lack of vital American interests in the area. When Germany and the EU were unable to deal with that conflict, a very bitter experience ensued for the U.S., Germany, the EU and the United Nations. This transatlantic fight over political decisions, backed by the use of force, continues today in the guise of disputes over military capabilities.

Throughout the 1990s, the newly-sovereign Germany addressed its security responsibilities in the Balkans through a painstaking political and legal process that has gained international respect and acceptance of the Bundeswehr. In the debate over German crews' participation on AWACS missions over Hungary - out of the NATO area - the Bundestag voted to send those crews and was promptly sued by one political party that voted for the AWACS crews' deployments. The Karlsruhe Constitutional Court ruled in July 1994, during President Clinton's visit in Berlin, that German soldiers could be deployed out of Germany as part of an alliance and with the consent of the Bundestag. Chancellor Kohl, in his news conference with President Clinton, immediately declared that the decision did not mean "Germans to the Front." Nevertheless, it meant just that, as we saw in subsequent events.

The Bundestag throughout the 1990s grappled with the creation of a consensus on Bundeswehr deployments, including political decisions to deploy logistics and support troops in Bosnia, the use of Tornado aircraft in combat missions, and eventually stationing infantry on the ground. By 1997 a Bundeswehr General was selected by General William Crouch to be his chief-of-staff in Bosnia. Naming a German General to the chain-of-command of a combat mission with Bundeswehr soldiers was a critical step in creating a normal relationship between diplomacy and the use of military force.

German willingness to support NATO enlargement in 1997 for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic was a major step in accepting security responsibilities for those countries as part of NATO, which is after all the alternative to a German High Command of its own.

In 1999 Germany joined the United States along with other European Allies in authorizing NATO to bomb Kosovo, which ended the Milosevic campaign of ethnic cleansing. That decision also set the stage for new international military intervention to prevent humanitarian disasters or human rights violations. The German slogan "Nie Wieder Auschwitz" took on new meaning from "no wars should emanate from German soil" to "German use of force to prevent genocide is legitimate and necessary."

When the United States was attacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001, Germany was politically decisive in coming to American aid and invoking Article V of the NATO treaty to use force to protect itself. At this point, however, the United States, shocked by this horrendous terrorist attack, turned back to its culture of self-reliance and ordered the American military into rapid action against the Taliban in Afghanistan, shunning its NATO partners for the military offensive.

The reaction in Europe to the 9/11 attacks was unprecedented solidarity and America found full support in the United Nations for the retaliatory attack on the Taliban. This solidarity came in part from the Europeans' own experience with terrorism. I first came to Germany during the terror of the Baader-Meinhof group and saw my fellow Army officers killed in Frankfurt, shortly before Palestinian terrorists killed the Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. Red Army Fraction terrorists were present during several of my assignments in the three Germanys. I recall the tragic deaths of my colleagues in the German Foreign Office as well as the chief of the Treuhandanstalt, the property trustee office disposing of East German property. Terrorism was recent, fresh and shocking; Treuhandanstalt chief Rohweder was assassinated in April 1991. German homegrown terrorism of the past three decades, led to genuine and strong German support for the American military reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

However, soon after the military action in Afghanistan, the U.S. decision to go to war against Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein to end its threat from weapons of mass destruction created a deep rift in transatlantic relations. Europeans questioned whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and saw no link between Hussein and Al Qaeda terrorists, while they agreed that Saddam Hussein was an evil dictator. American policy made Germany and France increasingly nervous and resulted in a Franco-German veto pact against the U.S. decision to invade Iraq.

In the 2002 Bundestag election campaign Chancellor Schröder rejected the U.S. policy of regime change in Iraq and even any thought of German military participation. His opposition to the war was very popular throughout Germany and contributed significantly to his election victory. The U.S. administration reacted to Schröder's opposition to American Iraq policy by declaring German-American relations "poisoned," a political move that put the administration clearly on one side in the 2002 election. The poisoned relations between President Bush and Chancellor Schröder have dominated German-American relations the past three years.

When the military action was over, no weapons of mass destruction were found and unease about "preemption" among our allies continued, despite the rapid military victory against Saddam Hussein. The war in Iraq led to a serious breakdown in trust between the United States and Germany. Even today the German public does not support any kind of military engagement in Iraq, though no one is asking for German troops. What could change after the inconclusive September Bundestag election? I do not see any change in German policy regarding Iraq or in the use of force to spread democracy.

Although the September election has yet to bring clarity to German-American relations, a new German coalition is unlikely to alter German security policy. Nor has it set Germany on a course of economic reform. Roger Cohen opined before the September 18 election that there are those who think Schröder "sold out to big business and communists from Eastern Germany who think their defunct country sold out to the West." The election resulted in a majority on the left that can be seen as rejecting further reform. I see the election result as public acceptance of the reforms under Schröder's "Agenda 2010," but rejecting further cuts in social programs. It is as if Martin Luther's statement: "Hier stehe ich, ich kann nicht anders." (Here I stand; I cannot do otherwise.) is the best analysis of the electoral decision on September 18. In any case, Roger was right on the mark with his analysis that the left-wing party's emergence has contributed to a hung Parliament. The lack of political will poses a serious obstacle to breaking a strong consensus in German politics against reform.

Germany has long struggled with a balance of economic growth and social justice, especially surrounding the debate for more "flexibility," which is often derisively called "Amerikanische Verhältnisse." However, Schröder has begun the move away from the entitlements that have enjoyed consensus support in the electorate. Agenda 2010 has made some headway in chipping away at the consensus blocking reform, but the German economy did not move toward Schröder's goal to reduce unemployment.

However, as Roger Cohen has noted, "in other respects, Schröder has been a chancellor who has guided critical change in Germany: from the stifled caution of Bonn to the openness of the "Berlin Republic;" from submissiveness to its American savior to a sometimes confrontational emancipation; from the wounds of division to a growing national unity; from lingering German shame to nascent German pride; from a shunning of Turkish immigrants to greater acceptance; and from the stiffness (and silence) of the postwar generation to the looser culture of the bear-hugging, Chianti-swilling Germans of today."

In other words, the electorate has said that Germany has come a long way toward being a less traumatized and a more "normal" country. What does that mean? Well politically, Schröder's "No" to military deployments in Iraq reminded voters that Schröder took a stand for German interests and remained firm in his resistance to sending the Bundeswehr into Iraq showing also that his 2002 position was not simply an election tactic. Schröder's steadfastness has put Angela Merkel in a difficult spot, whether she decides to buck public opinion over the use of force such as in war in Iraq or in Iran. Would she or any Chancellor tell President Bush no on important German policy issues? I believe that this will be increasingly the case in German-American relations.

There have been significant changes in German foreign policy over the past fifteen years, and I would describe two key developments: (1) the Bundeswehr is a capable and respected fighting force deployed abroad, while not raising the specter of German militarism and (2) the Franco-German veto of American policy has, at least temporarily, redefined that relationship to the disadvantage of American policy. Will these new elements now change after the September 18 German election?

Speaking on behalf of the CDU/CSU in Washington in late July, Wolfgang Schäuble praised the president for his Mainz trip with its initiative to set the U.S.-German relationship back on course. Referring to Angela Merkel's 2003 Washington Post op-ed piece, which complimented the administration's clear risk analysis of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, the CDU has noted the near-philosophical consensus with the administration today. The CDU has also made it clear that the Franco-German "veto" partnership against U.S. policy would change under a Merkel government. This change was also signaled in Merkel's visit to Paris and her meetings with Chirac rival Finance Minister Nicolas Sarkozy. We will have to wait and see how the Franco-German relationship develops in the face of policy challenges after the election before we know whether this new German reliance on Chirac to reject American policies will continue.

Angela Merkel or any German Chancellor will still have to accept the same German rejection of any military deployments in Iraq or exchange, in the sense of Berthold Brecht, the constituency strongly opposed to the Iraq war with a different German Volk. The Chancellor might seek to find a way to lead his people to accept a greater security role for the Bundeswehr and a larger defense budget, but that will be a long-term project. Such leadership is not impossible in Germany. Helmut Schmidt led the SPD to seek deployment of new intermediate range nuclear missiles, while also giving contrarian economic advice to presidents Ford and Carter. Can a new German Chancellor reject American policy or even be heard on policy advice?

Old formulas don't work. Germany is now sovereign and will act more often on German interests as a sovereign power. Germany's highest interest remains ensuring European integration with pooled sovereignty of its member states moves forward. The greatest danger in German-American relations is that the United States may have missed these political developments since the 1989 revolution and is likely to ask more than Germany can or will deliver. What kind of reaction will an American government have if its expectations of German political support are dashed when the German government disagrees?

In order to avoid a clash of high American expectations and German policy delivery, I would like to outline three urgent tasks for a "New Global Transatlantic Agenda." First, we must better understand the changes that were wrought on the night the Berlin Wall came down November 9, 1989, and when America was attacked on September 11, 2001. Following November 9, 1989, a preeminent America and NATO decided on new directions the world would take. By September 11, 2001, terrorists disrupted that partnership. With the contentious war in Iraq and a struggle to eradicate the terrorist threat, maintaining the transatlantic relationship has become more difficult. We need each other now in new ways, but need to recognize that in coming years we will succeed only in partnership. We need to implement President Bush's Mainz and Brussels initiatives to repair the transatlantic relationship.

Second, Germany has to continue to accept its new responsibilities as a fully sovereign country beyond its vital interest in European integration. Those responsibilities are not only to increase aid to the developing world or to urge ratification of both the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court, but also to take on global issues.

Third, as Henry Kissinger reminds us, we need to craft a common agenda and to work issues together - China and the Middle East are leading candidates for that agenda. Lifting the EU arms embargo against China is a case in point. Lifting the embargo at a time when China enacted new anti-succession legislation against Taiwan is politically questionable. Imperial Japanese Army actions in the region still plague East Asian politics. These unresolved issues from World War II have created lasting tensions among the Japanese and the Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, South East Asians, and others. Add to those historical grievances newly announced Japanese support for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait conflict, which aligns the United States with Japan in its security treaty, and you have a serious potential confrontation that pits the U.S. against its European allies.

Of course any future confrontation when the Chinese might fire upon the Taiwanese and consequently the U.S. orders its Seventh Fleet into the Strait, there is the possibility of Chinese arms, supplied with EU technologies or arms, being fired against the U.S. Navy. The reaction in Congress with its strong Taiwan lobby - there is no communist Chinese lobby to match - has already set course for vigorous action against our European friends. We need a much deeper understanding of China and our common interests in dealing with all aspects of that relationship.

In the Middle East, we need also a strategic dialogue leading to common policies to stabilize Iraq and to help the Iraqis provide for their own security and economic well being as well as to promote democracy. In Iran we have done just that with the "EU Three" and a European-American policy to bring both diplomatic and military power to bear on the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran. Iran's desire for those weapons is a common agenda item but cannot be one where the U.S. endorses diplomacy simply to win later support for UN sanctions nor for European use of force should diplomacy fail. Chancellor Schröder's recent rejection of the use of force in Iran sets the stage for another transatlantic standoff should the U.S. proceed with military force in Iran. A new German government is likely to agree with a policy of no use of force in Iran.

The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza also provides an opportunity for building on a global transatlantic agenda that is embedded in Quartet cooperation. We need to continue to support a non-violent transition and more actively promote peace through jobs. Germany has a major role to play in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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This essay is the text of a speech given at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Berlin on September 26, 2005 by Ambassador Bindenagel.

J.D. Bindenagel is vice president of Community, Government, and International Affairs at DePaul University, former U.S. ambassador and special envoy for Holocaust issues (1999-2002), and acting U.S. ambassador in Germany (1996-1997), as well as a member of the AICGS Advisory Council.
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This text appeared in the October 7, 2005 AICGS Advisor.