Dr. Condoleezza Rice's Rediscovery of Germany
By Walter Andrusyszyn

President Bush's appointment of Dr. Condoleezza Rice places another expert on Germany in the office of the Secretary of State. Similar to her predecessor, Colin Powell (not to mention Henry Kissinger well before that), Rice has been professionally engaged with Germany for decades. As a Director in the National Security Council (1989 to 1993), Rice was a key member of the team negotiating Germany's reunification and, as National Security Advisor over the past four years, she has experienced the demise of U.S.-German relations to, arguably, its lowest point in post-World War II history.

The prospects for U.S.-German relations in the coming four years, however, depend only slightly on Rice or her experience. Her relationship with Joschka Fischer is, in fact, a good one, but the president and Chancellor Schröder have grown far apart, both personally and as leaders representing two of the most influential countries in the world. Most people in Washington believe that the cause for this distance between the two countries was the chancellor's decision to make a strategic shift in the fall of 2002 (this view is not necessarily shared in Germany). His campaign to gain re-election was based less on anti-Americanism than on Schröder's symbolic insistence that Germany's policy would no longer be made in Washington. He exploited the German public's negative attitude toward the president to drive his point home, and the Iraq war issue was a timely, but coincidental, instrument for this shift.

Neither the president nor Rice are sentimental about the history or tradition of close U.S.-German ties. Similarly, Schröder was never apologetic or defensive about his conscious targeting of Bush. The hidden message of Schröder's public ridicule of the president's Iraq policy was that Germans would now shape their foreign policy based on Germany's national interest not the United States'. However, one of the characteristics of post-war Germany was that it never allowed itself a debate about Germany's interests, and instead, from Adenauer to Kohl, Germany's interests were always identified in Euro-centric terms.

Instead of welcoming a real debate on Germany's interests, the chancellor and other opinion makers rushed to take cover behind the EU and found a haven in France, especially in Chirac, who, it should not be forgotten, publicly endorsed Schröder's opponent a week before the September 2002 election. By now, Schröder certainly has made his point that German foreign policy is no longer made in Washington, but to the surprise of many not only in the United States, but particularly in Germany's neighborhood, Germany's foreign policy is now apparently "made in France." And a quick look at Germany's willingness to finance France's wish list in the EU shows that Chirac is a double winner of Germany's strategic shift.

The attempt by Chirac and Schröder to create the core of a European foreign policy that presents a "counterpole" (to use Chirac's term) to the United States has polarized the EU even more seriously than the cooling in trans-Atlantic relations. The diplomatic conflict over Iraq occurred simultaneously with the final phases of NATO and EU enlargement and one could argue that Chirac's hard-nosed push against the president at the time was meant to impose EU discipline on the new members. The result was a diplomatic victory for the United States among the countries of Central Europe who determined that supporting the United States, even in an unpopular war, was more important to their long-term interests than EU discipline. But the global cost remains a high one.

In this context, certain realities will shape U.S.--German relations in the coming years:

--France and Germany are unlikely to make any significant contributions to the rebuilding of Iraq as long as Chirac, Schröder and Bush remain in power.

--Fundamental trans-Atlantic confidence remains high as evidenced by steady levels of tourism, business visits and significant increases in investments.

--Other crises, possibly tragedies, will help us put aside differences over Iraq and once again find common ground.

Reconstructing U.S.-German relations will require Germany to make some symbolic gestures and substantive concessions, but Rice can take several steps to get relations back on track in the first six months of her stewardship of U.S. foreign policy:

First and foremost, repairing U.S.-German relations will not succeed by simply taking a bilateral approach. Instead, the new Secretary of State needs to make a highly public visit to key capitals in Europe within two months of assuming office, specifically to London, Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, Madrid and Rome. The visit should culminate in a visit to NATO to re-enforce the NATO Council as the cornerstone forum for trans-Atlantic consultations.

As apparently any effective agenda with Germany requires Paris' blessing, perhaps it would be prudent to start with France in developing that agenda. This might save time and help avoid headaches for both Washington and Berlin.

Another important step for U.S. policy makers would be to surprise and shock the German public by changing policy in areas that are high visibility in Europe but can be managed to accommodate U.S. interests. Namely, to find a way to join the ICC without giving up the protections that the United States need -- Article 98 agreements have turned into a diplomatic disaster. In this case it would be better to take the French approach -- re-open the negotiations and seek needed protections under the agreement rather than around it. Secondly, establish a procedure for either convicting or releasing the Guantanamo detainees. There is merit in taking such a step for domestic legal reasons, but it would jolt journalists and other opinion makers in Germany into re-assessing the current view that President Bush is leading the country down a dictatorial path.

Walter Andrusyszyn, Former Director for Central and Northern Europe National Security Council of the White House, is currently Manager for Business Development in Europe for Plastipak Packaging s.r.o. and a frequent participant at AICGS events.

This essay appeared in the December 16, 2004, AICGS Advisor.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.