The Case for Afghanistan
By Dr. Jackson Janes

Extending the Mission
The vote over extending the German troop presence in Afghanistan this week in the Bundestag was a forgone conclusion. The decision to keep the 3,500 troops stationed there along with the reconnaissance patrols of six Tornado jets was supported by the coalition government as well as the FDP. The Greens remain split over the issue and the minority Left Party predictably voted against it. Public opinion polls reflect a national mood which is divided over the question of Germany's presence in Afghanistan with many fearing that it will increase the chances of becoming a terrorist target. But the speeches in the Bundestag reflected a sense of responsibility for the future of Afghanistan, indeed for Germany as well.

The German debate over Afghanistan is about many issues. A central issue is the clash over how to combat the resurgent Taliban. The two missions, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) represent the reconstruction work needed and the military forces fighting the Taliban. The German troops are primarily designated for ISAF activities in the north and west of Afghanistan. Engagement in heavy fighting in the south is restricted to a small German contingent under the OEF mandate. The Bundestag so far has resisted NATO pressure to enlarge its ISAF mandate and engage its troops in the South. The difficult debate earlier this year over sending six Bundeswehr Tornados to complete missions in all ISAF areas best showed how tricky the question over heavy war-fighting still is for Germany, and how little credibility the OEF operations have among a German public at large that does not see itself as part of the broader U.S.-led war on terror, but also among German lawmakers who are very critical about German involvement in OEF.

The emphasis on ISAF activities in the north and northeast reflects the view that the best way to provide incentives to Afghans to reject the Taliban is to help them reconstruct their country. Critics of the OEF mission point to an overemphasis on military engagements which all too frequently result in civilian loss of life. The bottom line in the German debate is that OEF as an instrument in fighting terrorism and a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan has failed and that it proves to be counterproductive to ISAF efforts of reconstruction and nation-building. To keep its public at ease with the "good guys" mission ISAF, German officials try to draw the line as clearly as possible between both endeavors, ISAF and OEF. The fact that a distinction in mandate and military command structure is not reflected at all in the realities on the ground is being put aside for the matter of upholding an artificial "good war - bad war" separation.

Yet it is clear that both tools are needed in this war and the German efforts in the north are as important as are the U.S., Canadian, and Dutch troops fighting in the south. There will be no civil reconstruction without security, and security will never reach sustainability without civil reconstruction. The problem is that the use of the entire military presence in Afghanistan is restricted in a quilt-like arrangement determined by each national government, designating what they can and cannot do. That situation, as exemplified by Germany, is a reflection of the domestic arguments and public opinion surrounding the challenges since 9/11 six years ago.

As Much Harm as Good?
The invasion of Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks in the United States was seen for the most part in Germany as a justified response. The government in Berlin supported the U.S.-led military action and set in motion its participation under the ISAF roof along with other nations which were engaged in reconstruction efforts. German troops were assigned to creating so called PRTs (provincial reconstruction teams). While some 100 German troops are involved in the OEF effort, there is widespread criticism of the U.S.-led operation as causing as much harm as good in Afghanistan. Even the use of the German Tornados remains a controversial issue in Germany as some feel that they are thereby aiding the military forces in their attacks, and indeed they are. Yet the distinction wears thin on those who need the reconnaissance on the battlefield.

In a larger sense, Germany's presence in Afghanistan is a commitment to the Afghans to help them rid themselves of the plague of the terrorists and the Taliban. In doing so, all troops present in Afghanistan help create a safer world for all of us. But the fact that this message has not been a source of solace for most Germans is a reflection of what the public sees as real threats, and the level of trust they place in those who are explaining how to best confront them. The Bundestag can extend the mandate of German soldiers in Afghanistan but currently the voters would pull them home tomorrow.

That is a familiar scene to Americans, the majority of whom trust neither the President nor the Congress when it comes to understanding what is at stake in both Afghanistan and especially in Iraq. The White House - and the President himself - has lost credibility with the voters who are not clear about the stakes in Iraq and what sacrifices are required. The shouting matches among his would-be successors are not going to improve on those popular ratings during the coming months, regardless of who wins the nomination and the election thereafter. There is a decreasing level of patience around the country with the increasing sense of ambiguity about the purpose and the process of American engagement in Iraq.

In Germany, the perception of what is happening in Iraq can color the views of what is happening in Afghanistan. Amidst the bad news, be it suicide bombers, a booming opium trade, corruption at all levels, or kidnappings, the expectations of good news get dampened. The fact is that the presence of Germany in Afghanistan, like the United States, is a matter of many years to come, something that the public in both countries is not grasping. They cannot understand that long-term challenge if the decision to continue the mandate is a year to year matter, a situation that increases the impact of domestic politics on the decision.
 
An Eye on the Clock
In two weeks time, the Bundestag will take up the mandate of German participation in the OEF mission. That will also open up the controversy again. The mission will most likely be prolonged, for another year. But the real question is whether the justification for both missions is being sufficiently presented to a skeptical public. With an eye on a skeptical American public, General Petraeus has been saying that there are two clocks keeping time with regard to the American engagement in Iraq. One is the Washington clock, running increasingly on a presidential campaign schedule, and the other the Baghdad clock, running on the sluggish schedule of Shia-Sunni-Kurdish negotiations. The former is running faster than the latter. But the fact is that there will be an American presence well into the second term of whoever is elected President in 2008. The same holds true for the German presence in Afghanistan. Chancellor Merkel, in her second term, will be grappling with the same issues she faces now.

The leadership in both countries recognizes its responsibility to stay engaged in Afghanistan and this is unlikely to change in the near future. This is good news. The not-so-good news is that both countries suffer a tremendous lack of popular support of its foreign engagements, which is likely to increase with year-long costly involvements in countries very far away from home. Germans and Americans alike find it increasingly difficult to understand what interests our troops are fighting and dying for in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.

In a situation where the majority of its population is losing faith and trust in its governments, it seems to be a foolish strategy for politicians to avoid speaking the truth. As painful as it might be, officials need to be honest to its people - the ones who voted them into office and trusted them with leading the country - and tell the truth about the wars we are fighting. Even the German Defense Minister Franz-Josef Jung paints an odd picture of the mission of his troops in Afghanistan, trying to make the public believe they are there to provide humanitarian assistance and fulfill NGO-style missions. The acceptance level of casualties among the German public is unlikely to increase if the leadership publicly denies the danger that the troops are in. And Americans will continue to distrust politics if officials keep up the myth that engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq is a matter of a timeline limited to a couple of years.

There is no such thing as a "good war" and a "bad war." Both civil reconstruction helping the people to rebuild their countries and providing security for that effort are needed. Explaining that need for both engagements is just as difficult as the mission itself. But without solid public support, neither policy is sustainable.

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This essay appeared in the October 12, 2007, AICGS Advisor.

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Want to know more? Check out these links for more information.

"Deutschlands Verantwortung für Afghanistan," by Almut Wieland-Karimi, Berliner Republik, 2007.

"Germany to Keep Troops in Afghanistan," by Nicholas Kulish, The New York Times, October 12, 2007.

"German Parliament Extends Afghanistan Mission," Deutsche Welle Online, October 12, 2007.

"Bundestag verlängert Einsatz am Hindukusch," Die Welt Online, October 12, 2007.