German Foreign Policy: Between Continuity and Constraints
By Dr. Jackson Janes

The political tug-of-war going on in Berlin is not unfolding in a vacuum. While Germans debate the question of who shall be chancellor in what coalition, the earth continues to spin on its axis and the problems facing Germany, Europe, transatlantic relations and every other place on the globe remain. Iran has placed its nuclear program under the control of its army, leaving in doubt that the program has only peaceful purposes. The next phase of the Middle East road map is unclear as the Palestinians are trying to maintain a viable government and Sharon is wobbling within his own. Iraq continues to bleed daily, as do many parts of Africa from genocidal wars and HIV and parts of Asia from terrorist attacks such as in Bali.

The world does not wait for any one government to come to grips with itself, and governments are not given a time-out for making decisions in response to the world around it. Changes in command need not necessarily bring dramatic changes in policy direction, yet sometimes a combination of events and people do just that. During the first years of the current Bush administration, the coordinates of American foreign policy were recast according to both the convictions of the White House and then by the events following 9/11. The results were decisions and actions designed to adjust to the perceived threats to the United States, and the rest of the world had to adjust in turn. Such is the weight of the world's remaining superpower. In retrospect, however, the use of that weight would have been more effective had it been better aligned with that of its partners.

When Gerhard Schröder was elected chancellor in 1998, he did not anticipate making significant changes to German foreign policy. But then came Kosovo and the war in the Balkans, quickly followed by 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq. Berlin's responses reset the coordinates for Germany's foreign policy parameters. In retrospect, some of those resets might have been better had they been aligned with partners-more than one.

Germany's weight is not nearly as heavy as that of the United States, nor is that of the European Union. But the importance of Germany's decisions and actions, on its own or as a part of the EU, is significant for not only its own interests, but also those of many other parts of the world. The path which Germany chooses within Europe has and will determine in no small measure the choices Europe will have as it shapes its future. In the wake of the defeats of the referendum on a European constitution and given the challenge of an expanded European Union with more candidates lining up, the next phase of European integration will be one of the most difficult since it began five decades ago. The difficult beginning of negotiations with Turkey is illustrative of the latest challenge.

In light of these problems, German foreign policy, particularly amidst a set of uncertain coalition negotiations in Berlin, must be marked by continuity. The recent decision in Berlin to extend and expand Germany's mandate in Afghanistan is an example of this, despite the uncertainty of the next government in Berlin. The continuing presence of German troops to help maintain stability in the Balkans is another illustration. Maintaining a coordinated position with the UK and France with regard to negotiations with Iran will be another important component. These are some of the immediate demands for continuity on the new government in Berlin.

All of this is doable regardless of who becomes the Chancellor, the Foreign Minister, the Interior Minister, and so on. Germany has been successful in foreign policy when it is able to do what it does best - crafting alliances and networks and using its resources to build up trust and reliability by making its policies and interests always part of something larger than itself. That Germany has more recently been emphasizing its national interests within Europe need not mean that it is embarking on a drastically new foreign policy road. It means that it is becoming more like its European neighbors. However, there is a problem lurking in that development.

The fact is that the French-German equation is in transition following the confrontation with the United States over Iraq and in the wake of domestic battles at home. Assuming Angela Merkel becomes chancellor, relations with Paris will remain important but also juxtaposed against relations with Warsaw and London. That would be the case regardless of who rules from Berlin. However, following expansion of the EU, the Franco-German linkage has become part of a larger map involving interests other than in Berlin and Paris and which will bring together various forms of interest alignments and coalitions. Each member will be staking out their interests and networks to achieve them.

The run up to the elections in France in 2007 will generate more questions about the next generation of leadership in Paris, which may also stress French national interests. The challenge for the big three - Germany, France, and the UK - will be to provide a core source of energy for Europe while sending a message that everyone has a common stake in the process of reform. France and Germany need to solve their domestic issues as a first step in order to show that they are committed to maintaining the cohesion of the EU - including complying with its rules and agreements, such as the stability pact - if they are to be credible champions of the European movement.

The transatlantic relationship will continue to cause points of friction for Berlin in the form of the disagreements over how to deal with Iran, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, the future of the UN, and the continuing fallout in the Middle East emerging from the unpredictable situation in Iraq. Yet, there is very little leeway for Germany or Europe to avoid dealing with the United States on these issues. Hammering out a basis for talking with Washington may be frustrating but it is unavoidable. At a time when the Bush presidency is in serious trouble at home and on the global stage, there are that many more reasons to energize dialogue within the EU as well as across the Atlantic.

A new government in Berlin will not have a brand new set of choices to face. It will certainly have the same set of foreign policy challenges and will be well-served if it can maintain continuity in some areas while trying to exercise leadership with its partners in mapping the new areas of concern. The central problem will be to avoid the drain of self preoccupation in Berlin - a danger of a grand coalition - and to act as a source of encouragement to avoid it elsewhere in Europe. Germany and Europe need a project that transcends the current situation of uncertainty. There was one in the 1990s - the deepening of Europe along with its expansion. Today a new benchmark is needed to measure the boundaries of Europe. German leadership is essential to that process.

There is a danger that the process of self preoccupation can affect Germany, Europe, and the United States simultaneously as we all struggle to deal with our respective challenges, constraints and continuities, weaknesses and uncertainties. Given the global challenges requiring immediate attention, that is something we cannot afford.

We will soon see which German leaders emerge to deal with these challenges in the expected Merkel-led cabinet. Despite the quarreling leading up to it, they will all need to pull together if they are to be successful.

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This essay appeared in the October 7, 2005 AICGS Advisor.

Please direct comments to: jjanes@aicgs.org