Changing Parameters of Power
By Dr. Jackson Janes

Attempting to Change the Rules
There are certain moments in world politics when key players on the world stage seek to set down new rules or reinforce old ones. During the Cold War, there were many of the latter. The Soviet Union reminded the world in Hungary in 1956 and again in 1968 in Czechoslovakia that the parameters of Soviet control of its satellites were not open to change. In 1961, Moscow gave permission to its German satellite to build a wall through Germany to settle with concrete and barbed wire the divisions of 1945. None of those parameters lasted more than three decades. And the parameters of the Soviet Union fell apart eventually as well.

In 1962, the United States set its parameters down in a blockade around Cuba and spent the next few decades propping up governments to prevent Soviet influence from spreading elsewhere in Central and South America. More tragic efforts were to follow in Southeast Asia where the attempted imposition of parameters failed in the wake of years of war.

The course of the Cold War was marked by skirmishes around these parameters for decades until they were overcome not by military means but by the implosion of Soviet forces behind one side of that war. Parameters changed and many countries in Europe moved from Soviet space into their own and then into the new parameters of NATO and the European Union. Others have been lining up to do the same.

Upsetting the Stable European Apple Cart
Of course, the fact is that the more than six decades since World War II have been an extremely violent period outside of Europe elsewhere around the globe. Conflicts within and across borders have cost the lives of millions in Africa, the Middle East, South America, and throughout Asia, most dramatically in Mao's China, which managed to starve and murder millions of its own in the name of a great leap forward. Multiple wars in the Middle East kept reminding all that history was far from over when it comes to overcoming hate. The events of 9/11 and the terrorist acts that followed around the globe only underlined the continuing scourge of violence in the twenty-first century.

During the Cold War, Europe, in comparison, had been relatively quiet - despite the fact that it had become the site of the high concentration of military hardware faced off against two sides of the Cold War. It was not until the 1990s, after the death of the Soviet Union, that the contagious disease of violence and war reemerged on the European continent with a genocidal-like vengeance in the Balkans. The United States and the EU were caught off guard by this eruption and moved eventually to extinguish those fires with the force they had thought had become outdated in post-Cold War Europe. And still there remained the assumption that the use of military force would remain the exception on a continent that had learned the lessons of the past.

But then came a new signal from Moscow that parameters of power were still changeable and enforceable with military means. The invasion of Georgia was a rude interruption of what many in Washington and elsewhere in Europe had come to take for granted - the inevitable victory of geo-economics as a replacement of the dictatorships with the magnetic force of liberal democracy. The greatest weapon in the eyes of some Europeans for making peace in Europe, some would argue, was not an army but the Euro.

But the Georgian moment reminds us that when it comes to world politics, even in the twenty-first century, all options remain on the table. Yet, the more important question is: which remain the most viable? And which are currently available?

Europe and Germany's Role: as a Peace Broker?
The reaction in Europe to the Russian military move, and in particular in Germany, was initially a mix of criticism aimed at both Russia and Georgia along with calls for negotiating a cease fire. The criticism was aimed at Moscow and Tbilisi even though the Russian onslaught into Georgia was clearly overkill in more ways than one. French President Nicolas Sarkozy's effort to get a cease-fire agreement was seen as a sign of success for Europe as the facilitator of peace-making. Chancellor Merkel's follow-up visit with Russian President Medvedev in Sochi and then with Georgian President Saakashvili in Tbilisi seemed to underscore the dual approach: support Georgian independence but don't lay all the blame for the conflict at the feet of the Russians. As is widely argued in Berlin, Mikhail Saakashvili is a hot-headed leader who is viewed as a loose cannon. And so are the Russians, for any number of concerns in Europe and beyond, be it Iran, Afghanistan or proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Merkel's admonition in Tbilisi that Georgia's desire to join NATO remains viable - if not immediately - was a reminder to Moscow that its desire to dictate parameters to neighboring independent states is not acceptable. And yet, that is exactly what Moscow is trying to do and not only in the direction of Georgia. Neighboring Ukraine may also be on the target list among others in that volatile neighborhood.

A Russian "Wake Up Call"
So what are the parameters of power and influence in the aftermath of this "wake up call" from Moscow? What leverage does Moscow have in setting them and which of those parameters are viable for Europe and the U.S.?

Moscow's decision to move into Georgia is a reminder that Putin and Medvedev - presumably in that order - have the capacity, the will, and the domestic support to both project and employ force where it sees fit to demonstrate power and influence. That was a signal it has not sent in a significant way since 1979 in Afghanistan. That said, one also has to recall the results of that decision a decade later - not exactly a success story. Yet for now, the Russians are restating their claims of being able to influence the parameters of power in one sphere.

As for Europe, the European Union is going to be challenged to come up with a consensus mode to deal with Moscow. The newer members - the Balts, the Poles, and the Czechs, all of whom have more recent memories of Russian domination - are more conscious of their membership in NATO as a parameter of security than the EU membership. The economic interdependence between Russia and the EU - and particularly with Germany - is significant. Russia is in great need of things which Europe can deliver, like money, in the form of direct investment to help develop a very weak infrastructure. Russia is a major supplier of energy to Europe but that works both ways as far as interdependence is concerned. In general, attitudes are also driven by the belief that Russia and Europe share a continent together and that there should be more in common than should divide. But the current behavior in Moscow is not conducive to pursuing that agenda.

Within NATO, there is also room for arguments. The tools available to respond to Russia include what has already been applied: postponing further cooperation between Moscow and NATO on military matters, a standpoint which has now been matched by Moscow. But the debates among NATO members on how to proceed with membership for Georgia and Ukraine will be back on the agenda at the NATO ministerial meeting in December. Following the Bucharest NATO summit where Germany led a move to postpone the process for Georgia, there is little likelihood now that Chancellor Merkel will want to speed up that process, whereas others may want precisely that. And there remains a good deal of friction over the decision to place a U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, now to be equipped in addition with shorter-range Patriot missiles. By the time NATO gathers on the Rhine in April of next year to mark its sixtieth anniversary, the hope is that the Russian-NATO dialogue will be back on course. But at this point, that is a hope.

European Leadership Needed - Will Merkel and Sarkozy Suffice?
For now, the key European leaders managing this process are in Berlin and Paris. Sarkozy has the EU Presidency for the rest of this year and will need to utilize that platform to generate as coherent a set of positions toward Moscow as he can achieve. Given Germany's economic weight, Merkel can speak to the leadership in Moscow with the confidence of someone who can tell the Russians what they are risking with their behavior in Georgia and what they can gain if they change it.

Both of them are going to have to lead in another way in Europe. The impact of the Russian tanks rolling over Georgian territory may remind some of what happened this week in Prague forty years ago. Back then, the Soviet suppression of the Prague Spring was seen by many as a reality of the Cold War parameters, about which the West could do nothing. Today, that reality has given way to new parameters for more countries to shape their own decisions. That achievement needs to be underscored by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, as it is one of the more important points of leverage available.

The question is whether Putin and Medvedev will want to recognize that leverage. Yet, the situation in 2008 is not that of 1968. Russia does not and cannot afford to isolate itself as it did forty years ago. It needs the connections with Europe and the U.S. and with other partners if it wants to pursue its own interests. The same holds true for Europe and the U.S.

As history shows repeatedly, the parameters of power are not permanent. We are at another moment where we need to recall the parameters of our interests and principles as we manage this challenge as we have in the past.

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This essay appeared in the August 22, 2008, AICGS Advisor.

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Links and Press Coverage Surrounding the Georgia Conflict