The Day After
By Dr. Jackson Janes

Germany's complicated path to new elections in September begins formally with the July 1 vote in the Bundestag, in which the red-green coalition agrees to commit political suicide and award the Chancellor a vote of no confidence. Assuming that Federal President Köhler approves the procedure, one of the more interesting dimensions of this unique milestone will be how the campaign of the SPD and the Greens will be crafted during the next three months. Few reckon with a return to power in either camp. The projected margin of victory for the CDU/CSU, perhaps in coalition with the FDP, will not be as dramatic as it is now. Yet what will be the platform of the chancellor as he takes on Angela Merkel? He will of course argue that he has set Germany on the right path to reform, and that his Agenda 2010 strategy remains the prescription for recovery from the economic doldrums. The chancellor will challenge Merkel and the opposition to declare what they would do differently.

But perhaps that matters less at this point to the voters, most of them have already made up their minds. The chancellor will be stressing that he took on the problems Germany is facing and sought to do his best to solve them. And if he had a bit more time, he would complete the job. As this will probably not happen, Schröder, along with Joscka Fischer, will have to be content with the comments of history. The fact is that the chancellor has distanced himself not only from the voters in general, but also from his own party members in particular.

There are those in the opposition who are now complaining about seven wasted years. The arguments that the chancellor waited too long with his reforms are persuasive, yet it seems somewhat ironic that they are made by some of the opposition leaders who were in power for more than twice the tenure Schröder will have achieved in September, and who chose to sit out some of the economic problems, which evolved during their sixteen years in office.

What will be the legacy of the seven years of Red-Green? The coalition put together in 1998 was never completely coherent in its programs or policies. Late as it was in getting started, Schröder could argue that he was promoting the necessary changes in unemployment benefits (Hartz IV) and other tough cut backs in the welfare state in the name of preserving the social market economy and social justice. Only a red-green coalition, it was argued, could push such reforms through without having major demonstrations in the streets. Yet that strategy did not work because the voters did not buy into it as the continual losses suffered at the state level showed. Even the SPD itself was not of one mind on these reforms. The echoes of the experiences of Helmut Schmidt unsuccessfully trying to keep his SPD together in the last two years of his tenure ought to remind the Social Democrats that the internal wars they waged cost them sixteen years before they were able to regain power.

The legacies in foreign policy are perhaps a better demonstration of the so-called "only Nixon could go to China" analogy. If only a conservative Republican could open talks with communist China without being criticized for being soft on communism, then only a red-green coalition might have been able to lead the country into its first shooting war since 1945 without raging demonstrations in the streets of Berlin. The decision to engage in the Balkan wars was based on declaring German responsibilities to prevent both war and genocide, a position taken by the red-green government even without the cover of a UN resolution. Germany went on from there to assume long term responsibilities in the Balkan region, where it still makes up one of the largest military presences. Following 9/11, the chancellor faced down another vote of no confidence when he insisted that German troops be deployed in Afghanistan where they still are deployed today. Despite the shortfalls at home, the parameters of German foreign policy have been permanently changed.

Like any coalition, the legacy of Red-Green is a mixed bag of accomplishments and failures. Angela Merkel says that she wants to do things fundamentally different to make things fundamentally better. While Schröder's campaign will have to be based on arguing to stay the course toward Agenda 2010, not many will believe that he can sustain it. Merkel will be facing serious questions about her own goals: how will you be able to fundamentally reshape the parameters of reform with the support of an electorate wary of making more sacrifices? How much real unity does she have within the CDU/CSU group about reforms? How much common ground will she have with the FDP? How much change and how much continuity can we expect from a Merkel government? How will this new government look if the FDP does not make it into the Bundestag and the CDU will have to enter a grand coalition with the SPD?

Those are some of the questions which will be the basis of the campaign during the next eleven weeks. The day after the elections in September, we will begin to know the answers. There is an old saying in the military that the best battle plan never survives the first day of battle. The battle has already begun.

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This essay appeared in the June 30, 2005 AICGS Advisor.