Anticipating Angela
By Dr. Jackson Janes

In the tradition of American presidential campaigns, the candidates spend a great deal of time attacking both their rivals and Washington, D.C. Cleaning up the mess in the nation's capital and forging a new consensus is standard fare for the challenger who emphasizes independence from the entrenched vested interests and institutions. The cycle repeats itself every four or eight years, yet Washington never changes.

In the unfolding battle between Angela Merkel and Gerhard Schröder, the challenger will have the opportunity to present to German voters not only an argument about how to solve political and economic impasses, but also how to build a new consensus and to present herself as a new look for German politics in general. Apart from aspiring to be the first female Chancellor in German history, Merkel's own history is one that suggests she might bring new perspectives to Germany's political debates as German leaders and citizens struggle with domestic transformation, Germany?s role in Europe, relations with the U.S. and Russia in particular, and the transfer of power to a new generation.

Not many would have expected this. Merkel's path to September 18th will be forged by relentlessly attempting to grasp opportunities, one after another. In a political system and culture that is dominated by the machinery of party politics, her entry into the system in 1990, following the demise of the GDR, started a trajectory that few could have predicted.

Working through eight years of Helmut Kohl's commanding control of his party and the government in two ministerial positions did not promise her the role she has today. It was after Kohl's defeat in 1998 and the morass of the party's struggle with the party finance scandals that followed when Angela Merkel emerged as a willing and able leader, challenging her own mentor and the party to reform itself.

Yet her party was not quite ready to rethink those challenges. It was still very much under the control of those who had emerged from the old FRG political structure and its system of rewards. The fact that Edmund Stoiber was chosen to challenge Schröder in 2002 was an indication that the same people who had made up the conservative camp for decades were driving the agenda. With her lateral entry into the system, Merkel's ability to pose a viable challenge to Schröder was viewed with skepticism. Instead, many viewed Merkel as someone who was at best an interim solution for the party while others prepared themselves for the next electoral battle with Schröder. Those who could imagine her confronting Schröder in the 2006 scheduled elections saw her losing and then preparing the way for others, such as Minister President Roland Koch in Hesse or Christian Wulff in Lower Saxony, as the standard bearers of the conservative movement. But politics is not predictable, as Schröder illustrated by calling for early elections following his disastrous defeat in the state elections in North Rhine-Westphalia. He caught the opposition off guard and presented them with the immediate necessity to make a decision about candidates and the campaign. Put up or shut up, as the saying goes. And the decision to put their political money on Merkel was quickly reached by the CDU and CSU, despite continuing uncertainties about personalities, platforms, and positions.

Can she win in September? All the polls suggest she will, even though Schröder is a skillful campaigner and knows how to exploit issues and read the mood of the German public, as was clearly demonstrated in the 2002 elections. While his personal popularity remains strong, it may not be enough this time. Both Schröder and Merkel face the same problem: how do you tell the uncertain voters that serious changes and adjustments remain ahead without adding to their fears? What can a re-elected Red-Green coalition do differently in a third term, especially given the same political context of a conservative majority controlling the Bundesrat? On the other hand, what can a CDU/CSU/FDP coalition tell the public about their plan to gain control over the economic burdens that differs markedly from Schröder's but does not permit Schröder to portray them as cold-hearted capitalists? She will need to build a consensus not only within her own party but also with a CSU that often stresses the social in its name more than many in the CDU. And she will need to create common ground with the FDP, which has not been entirely in sync with itself on policy directions, leadership, and priorities.

While the election will turn primarily on those issues, the role of foreign policy considerations will not be entirely absent. Schröder is campaigning already on the record of a self-confident foreign policy, demonstrated in part by his confrontation with Washington over Iraq. Schröder will remind the voters that Merkel disagreed with his stance on Iraq. Given the continuing widespread negative attitudes toward George W. Bush throughout Germany, Merkel will need to find a balance between her version of Germany's foreign policy priorities and relations with Washington that will appeal to voters. In fact, Schröder may be counting on his upcoming visit to Washington to show the German voters that, despite the disagreement over Iraq, he can still forge relations with President Bush.

Presuming that the FDP Parliamentary Leader Wolfgang Gerhardt would be Foreign Minister in a coalition with the CDU/CSU and FDP, it is likely that a new team in Berlin will have less of a fixation on the Franco-German relationship, a tougher tone with Russia, which can be delivered by Merkel in fluent Russian, a skeptical view toward negotiations with Turkey over EU membership and an interest in sorting out what needs to be done with Washington. That said, there is no reason to think that a new team would have significantly more resources or capabilities to contribute in its foreign policy than the current coalition. While the rhetoric might sound different, the realities at home and abroad remain the same, be it the arguments over WTO issues, the future of German membership on the UN Security Council, or the willingness to help out in Iraq.

An additional challenge will be the uncertainty about the future of Europe following the failure of the French and the Dutch to ratify the constitution. Of all the countries in the EU, Germany has had the strongest commitment to Europe as a source of its own self-perception. If that foundation looks less certain and indeed questionable, it will have serious implications for the German debate over its own role in defining what kind of Europe is needed.

Angela Merkel will be challenging Schröder's record and policies but also asking the voters for their trust in her as someone who has experienced and represents dramatic changes in her life. In 1998, Schröder challenged Helmut Kohl, arguing that his team would not do many things differently, but would do things better. After sixteen years of the Kohl tenure, voters were ready for a change. Merkel must argue that change is going to mean doing things differently. She will epitomize that change in her own biography, as a woman, raised in eastern Germany, and a very different set of experiences from her west German colleagues. All of these factors differentiate her from Germany's political establishment, even though she has worked in it for the last fifteen years. Will she be the deciding factor, or will the Germans vote more against Schröder than for Merkel? Schröder is betting that Germans will not be willing to risk their future on Merkel, opening the possibility of a new coalition for the SPD with the argument that continuity is as important as change.

In early June of 2002, the red-green coalition in Berlin seemed to be at the end of the road and anticipating defeat in the September elections. But the drum beat of a looming war in Iraq and the flooding waters of the Elbe altered the mood enough to change the results anticipated by the conservatives. Whatever happens this summer, Germans are facing serious decisions anywhere they look. Almost everyone knows that many things need to be done differently. The question is: how much change and how much continuity will voters want to see in their leaders? The 2002 election was a razor-thin victory for Schröder. It may be that the 2005 race will be a closer one then the polls now suggest. Anticipating Angela might make some voters nervous where others see a chance for change. What happens between now and mid-September remains as unpredictable as the summer weather. But the climate of 2005 now recalls the climate of 1998: time for a change.

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This essay appeared in the June 2, 2005 AICGS Advisor.