Convincing Arguments: The Next Test for the Transatlantic Dialogue
By Dr. Jackson Janes

Opportunities for Change
With the many conferences and meetings organized by dozens of transatlantic policy organizations each year, opportunities to argue and trade positions or policies in public abound on both sides of the Atlantic. Sometimes in that process, minds can be changed and policies reconsidered. These exchanges are more like benchmarks, showing what the temperatures of certain conflicts are and where compromise might be found or on which issues there appear to be stalemates.

Now and then there are moments at such meetings when an issue becomes more sharply captured in a single speech or an exchange and remains a reference point well after the encounter is over.

In February of 2003, the Security Policy Conference in Munich was the stage for a dramatic confrontation between then-Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld over the impending war in Iraq. "I am not convinced" were the words Fischer directed at Rumsfeld concerning the rationale for military action against Saddam Hussein. Three years later, many remain unconvinced on both sides of the Atlantic that the war was indeed necessary, especially after determining that there were no weapons of mass destruction immediately threatening the world from Bagdad.

At the time, however, Fischer's words represented more than a statement about dealing with Saddam Hussein. They illustrated a change in perceptions about the nature of threats, the most effective response to these threats, and the definitions of needs and strategic interests shared across the Atlantic.

There had been a transformation of the transatlantic dialogue on these issues going on ever since the Berlin Wall fell and the geo-political equation between Europe and the United States was being redrawn. Soviet troops no longer threatening Europe's borders, the European Union expanding and developing its capabilities in political, economic and even military cooperation, and U.S. concerns focusing increasingly on China and the Middle East were all part of the remodeling of the transatlantic bargain, a bargain which had served its purpose well during the Cold War but now needed to be reworked.

While the search for a new mission was in full swing the events of 9/11 accelerated the process significantly, but it also left both sides of the Atlantic out of sync. Calls for NATO to be a more political forum for transatlantic debate ran up against the response of the Bush White House, which was less inclined toward group gropes in multilateral forums and more inclined to take actions against what it saw as imminent threats to the United States. Iraq was illustrative of the dilemma in trying to forge a common response.

Iranian Ambitions and Transatlantic Agreement
Today, that dilemma is captured again by the debate over Iran's nuclear ambitions. In contrast to Fischer's response to Rumsfeld, today's German leadership in Berlin, in addition to other European partners, is voicing more agreement with the United States.

Chancellor Merkel is convinced that a nuclear-armed Iran is a threat not only to the region but also to stability world wide. This is particularly accentuated following the statements of the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, calling the Holocaust a "myth" and for the end of Israel. Even if the Iranians are years away from securing nuclear weapons capability, preventing that from occurring remains a common task and a basic test of transatlantic resolve.

Yet, even if we agree that there is a danger looming in Iran for the whole region, what we can effectively do about it remains unclear. Sending the issue to the UN Security Council, which might impose some form of sanctions on an uncompromising Iran, is an option. But even then it is not certain what impact that might have on the powers in Tehran. Also, what we do as the next step after sanctions is not evident. A military option might be conceivable, but the longer-term impact can be disastrous.

Given this uncertainty, the fact that both sides of the Atlantic seem convinced about a threat does not lead to being convinced about the options. We are also not certain about the ability to keep the Russians and the Chinese engaged with a UN framework Are we then back to a situation in which a transatlantic consensus might be again endangered as we move forward? Are we going to wind up on the track to another transatlantic train wreck as we approach decisions that need to be made?

What Have We Learned From Iraq?
The question we need to ask is whether we learned anything from the experiences of transatlantic conflict over Iraq. Given the determination of the Bush administration to remove Saddam from power and the determination of the French and German governments to reject participation in that effort, there was not going to be a coordinated transatlantic approach to Iraq, at least in a manner that might have maximized the use of more carrots and sticks from both sides. The U.S. strategy was short-term in its thinking, particularly on the military side, and the intelligence provided was flat out wrong. Europe was divided and argued within itself about the choices the individual countries were confronting.

What does this suggest to us now with regard to options for dealing with Iran? In order to solve this problem, we need to enlarge the framework in which we approach it. That will involve engaging the neighbors of Iran. It will involve defining not only what we want but what the Iranians want, particularly now that their country is looking at large U.S. military forces based on their borders. It will involve taking every step possible to help stabilize Iraq as well as making sure that the Middle East peace process stays on track.

It will also involve trying every possibility to avoid painting ourselves into a corner where the military option looks to be the only solution. It will involve pooling our respective resources to provide a framework in which security is shared by all sides, and not reduced to a zero sum approach.

A Huge Challenge, But a Benchmark of Progress?
That is a huge challenge and it may be that we fail to meet it. Iran might forge ahead with its nuclear weapon ambitions and we may be unable to prevent that from happening.

This year's Munich Conference on Security Policy offers another opportunity to benchmark our progress and point toward the pitfalls in the road ahead. The changes that have been reshaping the German-American dialogue and the transatlantic relationships for the last decade or more will continue to challenge us to be more creative, responsive, and indeed attentive to what and how we work together. For the transatlantic relationship, getting a hold of this issue without having it dissolve into another feud over means and ends will be of critical importance.

Perhaps those attending the conference will be convinced at least that we have to remain together on this issue, however it is resolved, if we are to have the tools we need to deal with it. We will see how convincing that argument is made not only in Munich but for some time to come.

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This essay appeared in the February 3, 2006 AICGS Advisor.

Dr. Janes is attending the Munich Conference on Security Policy from February 2-4. For more information on the Conference, click here.

Please direct comments to: jjanes@aicgs.org

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Want to know more? Check out these links:

"Key Nations' Stances on Iran." BBC News Online Report, January 31, 2006.

"Atomic Agency Likely to Refer Iran to UN." By Elaine Sciolino, International Herald Tribune, February 3, 2006.

"Atomstreit mit Iran: In den Sicherheitsrat." By Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 31, 2006 (German only).