The European Union summit in Copenhagen illustrates where U.S. and German interests might find some common ground at a useful time.

The U.S. policy with regard to Turkey's pursuit of membership in the EU has been a consistent one through both the Clinton and the Bush administrations. Recognizing that it does not have a voice in the decision, the effort to encourage the EU to start negotiations with the Turks over membership has increased, as the strategic importance of Turkey looms even larger in the post 9/11 environment. With war threatening to break out against Iraq, the central role Turkey would play again in a confrontation with Saddam is a key part of the U.S. plan. But the U.S. has always seen Turkey's NATO membership as a basis for EU membership, much to the dismay of many Europeans. In fact, the White House lobbying which took place before the Copenhagen meeting was seen by many EU members as counterproductive for the Turks who themselves were very aggressive straight through the summit proceedings.

Yet, in the end, the decision taken in Copenhagen seems to have been accepted as the best of all solutions by all sides, more or less. Turkey has been given time to get its domestic act further together by the end of 2004 in preparations for accession talks in the following year. The EU has been able to emphasize the need for Turkey to meet its requirements for membership without looking for loopholes. And the U.S. was able to conclude that they had made an effort to help Turkey's bid at a time when Turkey's help will be needed if a war in the Gulf breaks out next year.

It should be noted that this result offers proof positive that the cold front between Washington and Berlin may be warming up again. Germany took a lead role in crafting a result which was a compromise but also a good solution for all. The Germans and the French got together on this compromise before Copenhagen and were able to sell it at the summit as a joint effort. The Schroeder/Fischer team took the position, in both domestic terms as well as in Copenhagen, that Turkey should be given the chance to measure up to the EU criteria and that slamming the door in Ankara's face was a bad idea. That was not an easy position to take particularly with the opposition CDU/CSU taking a strong stance against Turkish membership.

This is an example for both Washington and Berlin that the common agenda for the coming year will be more important to address than to speculate whether or not Schroeder and Bush will ever really become close friends. It remains obvious that there is going to be a set of differences in dealing with that agenda. There remains much to learn in Washington about the ways in which Germany and the European Union shape their political decision-making processes and the same challenge remains for the Germans and the EU when it comes to dealing with Washington. But that does not inhibit coming to compromise and cooperation as can be seen in this case and also in the case of the Balkans.

The year ahead will put even greater strains on these efforts. Both sides of the Atlantic must sort out what are the needs and capabilities involved in dealing with Iraq and the larger regional dangers. Whatever solution is found for Saddam Hussein, we will need to keep our common eye on the common stake we have in securing this volatile part of the world from spinning out of control. The problem is the differences between the threat assessments. The American approach of linking everything to the war against terrorism - therefore the push for Turkey's membership in the EU - is not in sync with the German approaches to the dangers perceived in Europe and in the Gulf in the wake of potential military intervention.

No matter which way one looks, 2003 promises to be a tough year. All the more reason to concentrate on the opportunities to find ways of seeking out the nuts and bolts of making compromises work, as it did in Copenhagen.