After the Elections - German-American Agendas
By Dr. Jackson Janes

The reactions to the election results on November 2nd among Germans and other Europeans were made up of a mixture of amazement, disappointment and perhaps relief. Amazed at the willingness of Americans to reelect a president even with everything from missing weapons of mass destruction, Abu Ghraib, and economic uncertainties counting against him, European recognition that the Bush presidency was not a fluke but will continue for four more years was grudging and left many wondering what it will portend for transatlantic relations. Others rushed to the conclusion that with Bush in the White House, Germans might be better off as the unilateral president might not be as demanding as a President Kerry might have been.

Beyond the election results, one sees a searching effort to make sense of an America that appears to be moving in a direction very different from European societies. The focus on the role of religion in political life in America underlines the divergence. The debate over the content and meaning of values as a driver in the campaign leaves many Germans floundering. No German politician wears his or her religious beliefs so visibly on his sleeve as does George W. Bush. And Germans are far more preoccupied with battles over health care, and taxes and gloomy economic news than with church attendance.

The negative ratings for Bush in Germany remain high but the question is whether attitudes toward an America that has just reelected him with a clear majority will change more broadly for the worse.

The answer is most likely no.

The fact is that we have seen this movie before. The Germans' reaction to the elections of Jimmy Carter -- that peanut farmer from Georgia -- or to Ronald Reagan -- that B movie star from Hollywood -- were similarly negative in the early stages of their presidential terms. Even the still much admired Bill Clinton was viewed skeptically when he was first elected to the White House. How Americans choose their presidents has never been well understood in a Europe used to a parliamentary system selecting political leaders.

It is true that Bush represents a great deal of the stereotypical images of the United States rampant in Europe, starting with his Texan branding. But the more important basis for transatlantic relations remains the mix of policy interests and decisions affecting each nation. The fact is that Germany and the European Union remain tightly bound to the United States in so many dimensions that outweigh the ups and downs of public opinion polls. No matter what the measure, the degree of interdependence shared across the Atlantic is unique. That brings problems as well as opportunities. It also makes our respective domestic policies a part of that interdependence. The enormous preoccupation with the American elections in Europe, particularly in Germany, is just one indication. Of course, the equation of interest is not in balance. The degree of interest in Germany's domestic politics, elections or other matters among Americans is far less visible than the other way around. In addition, the number of Americans who were exposed to Germany in a personal way during the past few decades, primarily those millions sent there by the military during the decades after 1945, is diminishing.

While we are heavily intertwined in each other's affairs this does not necessarily translate into more understanding or even tolerance of the differences we encounter. Familiarity can breed as much contempt as understanding.

The next four years of German-American relations are going to be driven by a changing combination of domestic debates, definitions of interests and goals on the foreign policy stage, and events. The situation in Washington will be reflected in a confident White House seeking to move its agenda forward with a Republican majority in Congress and a weakened Democratic party trying to challenge both. The foreign policy agenda will be shaped by the continuing turbulence in Iraq and Afghanistan, a new situation emerging in the Middle East after Arafat's demise, and a wide range of other issues still on the political front burner.

In Germany, the battle over the next federal elections to be held in the fall of 2006 is already in full gear, with Chancellor Schröder lining up against the expected challenge of Angela Merkel. The agenda will be in large measure driven by the domestic issues consuming Germans, but also by the impact of developments within the EU, the debate over negotiations with Turkey, and events in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, among many others.

Throughout these coming months and years, the questions for German-American relations are: how will our respective debates and arguments impact each other? How will Germany and its policies remain relevant to the decisions being taken in Washington? What will be the effect of a situation in Iraq and Afghanistan getting worse before it gets better? What if there is another terrorist attack in Europe or in the United States? How high can the euro climb and the dollar sink without that divergence becoming a serious transatlantic problem?

There are many points at which German and American interests coincide in dealing with the immediate challenges we face. The problem will be in finding common ground in forging policies that more frequently compliment than confront each other. That is as much a function of the policy processes being in sync as it will be a product of the domestic debates on both sides of the Atlantic.

Much depends on the leadership in Washington and Berlin sending out their messages about these concerns, and listening carefully to those they receive. By the time Chancellor Schröder and President Bush meet to discuss them in the first part of 2005, the groundwork will need to be carefully prepared.

The last two years have alerted us to what the consequences can be if it is not.

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This essay appeared in the November 12, 2004 AICGS Advisor.