On Sunday, May 22, 2005, North Rhine-Westphalia elected a new state parliament. After 30 years, the current SPD-led government was voted out of power; the CDU won almost 8 percent to achieve a total of 44.8 percent of votes, and is therefore the obvious winner of the elections. The SPD lost 6 percent (37.1 percent total), the FDP lost almost a third of its voters (6.2 percent total) and the Greens lost 1 percent for a total of 6.28 percent.
Shortly after the results of the election were made public, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) declared that "the bitter results of the elections in North Rhine-Westphalia for my party question the political basis for the continuation of our work." He believes that a clear mandate from the people is essential for the necessary continuation of the reforms and he will work with President Köhler, using the possibility of new elections as offered by the constitution (basic law), to "hold early elections for the German Parliament as soon as possible, thus realistically in the coming fall."
The political consequences of a state election for federal politics are usually limited. The elections in North Rhine-Westphalia, however, caused strong waves on the federal level and might lead to the early end of the federal red-green government.
The decision to hold early elections is unexpected. Before May 22nd, many speculated about the consequences that a loss in the state elections would bring for the red-green government. The political commentaries, however, were unified in their assumption that the red-green government in Berlin would not loosen their grip on power prematurely.
North Rhine-Westphalia has sixteen million inhabitants, which makes it Germany's largest state. It was also the last one with a red-green coalition in power. Almost twenty years after the first red-green coalition came into power in Hesse, the last red-green state government lost its power in North Rhine-Westphalia. The elections in North Rhine-Westphalia were also perceived as a test for the red-green coalition governing on the federal level after being almost halfway through its legislative period. The mood was, and is, not good; although Schröder started the biggest reforms in German post-war history with Agenda 2010, reforms that the CDU in case of a victory in the federal elections would in principle not scale back, the people felt personally affected by the budget and social services cuts that were connected to the implementation of Agenda 2010. These cuts were very immediate and painful, whereas the success of the reforms will only become visible in the middle- and long-run. Why then would the SPD in this situation pursue early elections?
Two possible reasons for this decision are obvious: There is, for one, the political balance of power between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat*. While the red-green coalition holdsthe majority in the Bundestag, the Bundesrat is dominated by the CDU-led states. Over 60 percent of the adopted laws need, however, the approval of the Bundesrat and could be delayed or even rejected. With a two-thirds majority the Bundesrat could even completely block any legislation. Professor Hans-Jürgen Papier, constitutional law expert and President of the Constitutional Court, believes that the Bundesrat turned into a "second opposition." It functions less and less as a representative of specific state interests but more and more as a political party counterpart to the federal government.
After the election in North Rhine-Westphalia, the CDU-led countries achieved a record and surpassed the seemingly insurmountable hurdle to gain a two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat. The only reason why it would not come to a total blockade of the federal government is that the CDU leads a big coalition (a coalition consisting of SPD and CDU) in three states and has codified in the coalition contract to abstain when contentious issues are on the agenda.
Should the CDU win the elections in the fall and govern with the FDP, they would hold a majority in the Bundesrat for the following three years, which represent the longest and most important part of the legislative period, even if until then all CDU-led states would be turned over to the SPD in their respective state elections.
A second important reason for Schröder's decision are the long-standing tensions within his own party. The left wing of the SPD does not condone the cuts in the social net which are part of the Chancellor's reform project , and they have threatened to deny their consent and even to initiate their secession from the party. Schröder, probably rightly so, feared that the left wing of his party would increase the pressure and provoke the splintering of the party after the lost elections in North-Rhine Westphalia.
So his decision to work toward early elections spared him the difficulty of governing against the Bundesrat and at the same time prevented his party from breaking apart. Behind this decision is also Schröder's hope to win the voters over once again for his reform projects before September. He also bases his hope on the time factor, which favors him against the opposition; neither CDU nor FDP have really laid out meaningful concepts for the difficult topics of taxes, labor market policies, and economic growth.
Almost all parties that are represented in the Bundestag greeted the news of early elections in the fall positively. The question, however, of how the elections should be brought about, remains. The Chancellor will call for a vote of confidence in the Bundestag no later than July 1. If the Chancellor does not receive a majority, the President can dissolve the parliament within three weeks.
The question of how constitutional these proceedings are remains because Chancellor Schröder would be asking for a vote of confidence despite the red-green coalition's control of a majority of 304 out of 601 members of the Bundestag. The loss of the election in North-Rhine Westphalia did not change this.
In 1983 the Federal Constitutional Court demurred this procedure, which was practiced by Schröder's predecessors, Chancellors Willy Brandt in 1972 and Helmut Kohl in 1982. Constitutional law expert Hans Herbert von Arnim in Speyer believes that this method is "unconstitutional," but does not believe "that the Supreme Court will shoulder the political responsibility and block the opportunity for a way out that presented itself as a result of the government-Bundesrat blockade." The dissolution of parliament is constitutionally objectionable because the government should not be allowed to determine the date for the next elections out of tactical reasons. However, this is not being considered at the moment; Von Arnim says that "this is something stately and honorable. Schröder opens up the possibility for the voter to obtain a change in power and to end the blockade by the Bundesrat."
Not IF, but HOW they can achieve early elections is the hotly-debated question at the moment. The exact procedure of the vote of confidence is being developed by constitutional experts of the SPD, as well as political strategists who are working together to find a constitutional method that will also be favorable to the SPD in the election.
New elections brought Willy Brandt and Helmut Kohl to power; if Gerhard Schröder is as lucky will be seen in the fall. Until then, everybody will be speculating who could possibly take over what post in which future cabinet.
.........................................................................................................................
Footnote:
* The Bundesrat consists at the moment of a total of 69 members. The number of votes and thus the number of members depends on the size of the population in each state. Each state has at least three votes (or members), states with over 7 million inhabitants, North Rhine- Westphalia is one, a maximum of six votes (Article 5, II, German Basic Law). The members of the Bundesrat are not elected by the people but are members of the state governments.
This article was a result of Dr. Neukirchen's Die Zeit/AICGS Fellowship in 2005.
This article was translated by Kirsten Verclas and appeared in the June 2, 2005 AICGS Advisor.
.........................................................................................................................
For the original German version, please click here.